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THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS:
CONSTITUTIONALIZED TREATY LAW
IN ECUADOR
STEPHEN MEILI*

I. INTRODUCTION
In an era of global economic crises, escalating armed conflict, and massive
refugee flows, the gap between the ideals envisioned by the international
human rights framework and the reality of life for the world's 224 million
non-citizens continues to widen. 1 While the rate of human rights treaty
ratification has grown exponentially over the past few decades, there is much
scholarly debate about whether such ratification has actually altered the
human rights records of ratifying states. 2 Indeed, non-citizens in all parts of
the world face an ever-expanding array of human rights violations, including
discrimination based on migration status, physical and emotional abuse,
arbitrary detention, and limited access to justice.3 These violations often go
unaddressed.

* University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to Richard Abel, Jose Alvarez, Tony Anghie,
Zachary Elkins, Thomas Ginsburg, Alexandra Huneeus, Anne-Marie Marshall, Alejandro Anaya
Muioz, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Kathryn Sikkink, Kiyo Tsutsui, Ingrid Wuerth and numerous members
of the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School for their helpful insights in the development
of this article. My thanks also to University of Minnesota Law Librarians Connie Lenz and Loren
Turner, and law students Nicholas Bednar ('16), Mary Georgevich ('18), Nicholas Hittler ('16) James
Keeble ('15), and Gloria Munoz ('16) for their research assistance, and to my Administrative
Assistants Elizabeth Colfield and Jean Wells for their logistical support. © 2017, Stephen Meili.
1. UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REPORT 2015 1 (2015), http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport20l5-H
ighlights.pdf
2. For a summary of the literature on human rights treaty effectiveness, see infra note 17.
3. See David Weissbrodt and Stephen Meili, Human Rights and Protection of Non-Citizens:
Whither Universality and Indivisibility of Rights, 28 Refugee Survey Quarterly No. 4 (2010) at 57
("Non-citizens in various parts of the world are subject to discrimination, physical and emotional
abuse, arbitrary detention, and limited access to justice, among other human rights violations"). See
also Matthew Gibney, Precarious Residents: Migration Control, Membership and the Rights of
Non-Citizens 2 (UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME HUM. DEV. REPORTS, Research Paper
No. 2009/10, 2009) ("[S]ome non-citizens may, upon entering a state, find themselves with hardly
any rights at all, including the right to reside legally in the state. As well as possessing a lowly social
and political status, these migrants may be socially segregated from other members of society with
few opportunities for transferring their status to one with more extensive rights and entitlements").
4. See Weissbrodt, supra note 3, at 2. ("Often, xenophobia and racism at times reflected in a
country's legislation prevail, and serve to deny non-citizens the rights which they are guaranteed by
international law. This leaves non-citizens subject to harassment and abuse by political parties,
officials, the media, and by society at large. At the same time, it is usually the case that non-citizens
cannot assert their rights for fear of retribution. They usually have no way of participating in the
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Some scholars have identified constitutionalization of human rights law as
a mechanism that heightens the effectiveness of human rights treaties.5 As
Zach Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons have noted, both the number
of rights included in the typical national constitution and the number of
countries with such rights in their respective Constitutions have steadily
increased over the past several decades.6 Indeed, according to Wayne
Sandholtz, "by the 21 s century, constitutional protection of human rights had
become the global standard.", 7 Such constitutionalized treaty laws provide a
potentially powerful mechanism through which domestic human rights
mobilization can occur."
But constitutionalization is only part of the equation. Now that human
rights law is an increasingly prevalent part of the legal toolkit available to
lawyers and other advocates in domestic courts around the world, how can it
best be put to use? And how can scholars measure such success?
Questions regarding the effective use of constitutionalized human rights
law are particularly pertinent in states with limited or nascent democracies
and only a partially developed tradition of advocacy for non-citizens.
Non-citizens in authoritarian states have little chance of protection from
human rights violations or access to lawyers who might advocate for them.
On the other end of the spectrum, non-citizens in highly developed democracies are likely to benefit from strong democratic institutions and enjoy access
to well-established networks of cause lawyers, NGOs, and grass roots social
movements. It is non-citizens who flee to countries somewhere between
those two extremes who present situations that particularly deserve further
scrutiny.

political process so as to assure legal protection. As a result, non-citizens are left without the means
effectively to challenge or have remedied violations of their human rights.").
5. "Constitutionalization" in this context refers to the process through which national governments
incorporate into their constitutions human rights provisions contained in international human rights
treaties or other instruments. In some cases, this involves direct reference to the treaties within the
national constitution. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights:
Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 Harv. Int'l L.J. 61 at
64-65 (2013) (finding that the transmission of rights from international human rights instruments to
national constitutions affects rights performance on the ground: "We find that ... international
[human rights] instruments have a powerful coordinating effect on the contents of national
constitutions... This finding also suggests that international law is most effective when it works with
domestic institutions, including constitutional structure." Incorporation of international human rights
law into other forms of domestic law, such as statutes, is also associated with improved treaty
effectiveness. See also Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum-Seekers?: Lessons
from the United Kingdom, 48 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 123 (2015) at 172-73. See also Wayne Sandholtz,
Treaties, Constitutions and Courts: The Critical Combination, in THE POLITICS OF THE GLOBALIZATION
OF THE LAW 29, 29-46 (Alison Brysk ed., 2013).
6. Elkins, et al, supra note 5 at 63. The constitutionalization of individual duties and responsibilities has also proliferated during this period. See also Fernando Berdion Del Valle and Kathryn
Sikkink, "(Re)discovering Human Duties: Individual Responsibility in International Human Rights
Law and Global Constitutions," paper delivered at Workshop on The State of the Field: Challenges &
Opportunities in the Study of Human Rights, University of Minnesota Law School, April 8, 2016.
7. Sandholtz, supra note 5 at 31.
8. Elkins, et al., supra note 5 at 92.
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This issue lies at the intersection of scholarship on treaty effectiveness and
,.cause lawyering," the latter of which examines lawyers whose professional
work combines representing individual clients with advocacy for larger
causes. 9 While informative, the bodies of literatures addressing these areas
overlook some critical questions. For example, while several quantitative
studies suggest that constitutionalizing human rights law provides a pathway
to greater protection of rights, there is little qualitative empirical research
about how those laws may impact rights practices in a specific given case. o
And while cause lawyering literature describes the work of cause lawyers
in a variety of practice sites around the world, it is more descriptive than
analytical-it fails to develop theories of how these lawyers can become
more effective."1 Moreover, most of the scholarship in both fields analyzes
states' treatment of their own citizens: does the state torture them, provide
them with due process, or prevent them from being discriminated against?
How do cause lawyers go about trying to influence those practices? Few
studies in these fields analyze the treatment of, and advocacy for, noncitizens in particular. Given the growing number of refugees and other
categories of displaced persons around the world, this presents a knowledge
gap that must be addressed.
This article addresses that gap. It qualitatively analyzes how cause lawyers
utilized human rights law embedded in Ecuador's 2008 Constitution to
successfully challenge a presidential decree that limited the rights of asylumseekers in that country, most of whom were fleeing the armed conflict in
neighboring Colombia. 12 In its August 2014 decision striking down parts of
Presidential Decree No. 1182, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador invoked
human rights laws contained in Ecuador's 2008 Constitution, including
universal citizenship and the prohibition of discrimination based on migration status. While not a complete victory for non-citizens and their advocates
(it let stand the President's ability to restrict constitutional rights through
executive fiat rather than the normal legislative process) the decision demonstrates how constitutionalized human rights law may, under certain circumstances, alter state practices in countries lacking fully developed democracies. Those circumstances include the presence of domestic and transnational
cause lawyers who are able to navigate the local legal and political landscape
in order to maximize positive outcomes for their clients, the state's global
reputation for protecting non-citizens, the degree to which a constitutional
challenge on behalf of non-citizens threatens key state actors, and whether

9. See Stuart Scheingold & Austin Sarat, SOMETHING To BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM
AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004).
10. See Sandholtz, supra note 5; Elkins, et al. supra note 5; Torelly, infra note 24.
11. See Marshall and Hale, infra note 35.
12. Presidential Decree No. 1182 reduced the time limit for applying for asylum in Ecuador from
90 days after arrival in the country to 15 days and reduced the time to appeal a rejected asylum claim
from 15 days to three days. It also narrowed the definition of "refugee" under Ecuadoran law to
exclude those fleeing generalized violence, such as the armed conflict in Colombia.
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the state has other means to accomplish its objectives short of violating the
rights of non-citizens.
Ecuador is an ideal site for an analysis of some of the legal and political
conditions under which human rights treaty law may be utilized by lawyers
representing non-citizens in domestic courts. It has the highest concentration
of refugees as a percentage of total population of any country in Latin
America. 13 Its constitution has the largest number of human rights provisions
in the world. 14 It has a reputation (arguably now tarnished) for respecting the
rights of non-citizens. 15 And it has a small but active civil society that
includes lawyers and other activists who have advocated on behalf of
non-citizens in a variety of ways, including rights-based litigation, lobbying
and grass roots mobilization. Moreover, the recent Constitutional Court
decision rejecting parts of Decree 1182 demonstrates that, at least in certain
situations, the Ecuadoran judiciary is willing to block executive actions that
restrict constitutionalized human rights protections for non-citizens.
Analysis of these conditions has implications well beyond Ecuador. If
effective advocacy through constitutionalized human rights law is not possible in Ecuador, it may not have much of a potential role in other developing
democracies. On the other hand, if such advocacy is successful in Ecuador,
the same factors may enable it to be successful elsewhere, particularly in
16
areas currently experiencing large-scale refugee migration such as Europe.

13. See UNHCR, MID-YEAR TRENDS 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/58aa8
f247/mid-year-trends-june-2016.html (Last visited on August 8, 2017). According to UNHCR
estimates, as of mid-2016, Ecuador had 121,535 refugees, which constitutes a ratio of citizens to
refugees of 137 to 1. The only other Latin American country with a remotely close ratio is Venezuela,
with 183 citizens to every refugee. Id. Brazil's ratio is 23,272 citizens to every refugee. The ratio in
the U.S. is 1,199 to 1. Id. UNHCR includes in the category of refugees persons recognized as refugees
under the 1951 Refugee Convention and those who "face protection risks similar to those of refugees
but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained. Id. at notes 2 and
3. See also Worldometers, "Countries in the World by Population (2017), available at http://www.
worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/.
14. See Comparative Constitutions Project, Constitution Rankings, http://comparative
constitutionsproject.org/ccp-rankings/. Ecuador's 2008 Constitution contains 99 human rights, out of
a total of 117 such rights contained in all of the world's constitutions in the aggregate. The country
with the second highest total is Serbia, with 88. The average number of human rights in national
constitutions is 50.1. The U.S. Constitution contains 35.
15. See discussion, infra.
16. As of this writing, there have been no reported domestic court challenges to individual state
policies in response to the current European refugee crisis. The European Commission has opened
infringement procedures against Hungary for its response to the recent influx of refugees from Syria
and elsewhere, and 19 EU Member States, including Hungary, for their failure to properly transpose
into domestic law the relevant EU asylum directive. See European Commission Press Release:
Commission opens infringement procedures against Hungary concerning its asylum law. (10
December 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-IP-15-6228-en.htm; European Commission
Press Release, More Responsibility in managing the refugee crisis: European Commission adopts 40
infringement decisions to make European Asylum System work. (23 September 2015), http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-5699_en.htm. Although the constitutions of several European countries
include the right to asylum, some scholars have suggested that "constitutionalized asylum" in Europe
is dormant because of relief available through the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
See Helene Lambert, Francesco Messineo and Paul Tiedemann, Comparative Perspectives of
Constitutional Asylum in France, Italy, and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?, 27 Ref. Sur. Quart., No.
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Part I of this article reviews the relevant scholarship on treaty effectiveness
and cause lawyering. Part II discusses the article's methodology. Part III
examines the underlying political and legal context within which the Constitutional Court litigation on Decree 1182 occurred. Part IV analyzes the
litigation itself, including the strategy of the lawyers involved in it. Part V
offers a series of observations and conclusions, including a set of factors
under which constitutionalized human rights law may lead to improved rights
outcomes for non-citizens.

II.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY NORMS AND CAUSE LAWYERING

Over the past several decades numerous scholars have considered the
factors that impact state compliance with human rights treaties. 17 As the scale
of human rights treaty ratification has increased exponentially during that
time, scholars have endeavored to determine whether such ratification
actually improves respect for human rights by governments, or whether it is
mere window dressing that conceals stagnant or, in some cases, worsening
human rights records.18 This literature, which largely consists of quantitative

3, 18-32 (2008). However, asylum is broader than refugee status, and as the Court of Justice of the
European Union has noted, "Member States may grant a right of asylum under their national law to a
person who is excluded from refugee status." See Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Asylum as a General
Principle of International Law, 27 Int. J. Ref. Law (2015) 1, 5, (citing Joined Cases C 57/09 and C
101/09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B & D [2010] EC 1-10979).
17. For a helpful summary of this literature, see Kevin L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer,
Disaggregatingthe Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 Va. J. Int'l L 459-80 (2016); Alison Brysk and
Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, The Politics of the Globalization of Law, in THE POLITICS OF THE
GLOBALIZATION OF THE LAW 1-25 (Alison Brysk, ed., 2013); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & James Ron,
Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and QuantitativeEyes, 61 World Pol. 360
(2009); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of Human
Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 97 (2012); Oona Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the
InternationalLaw of Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, 234 (Sanford Levinson, ed. 2004). The
literature on human rights treaty effectiveness is a subpart of the much larger scholarship on
compliance with international treaties more generally. See Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and
Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273-96 (2010) [hereinafter "Simmons (2010)"] (reviewing the
literature on treaty compliance in the areas of security, war and peace, international trade,
environmental protection, and human rights). As Simmons notes, some of the factors encouraging
compliance with international treaty obligations in other areas are inapplicable in the human rights
context because states generally see the treatment of foreign nationals as beyond their concern and
human rights does not encourage reciprocity, thus weakening the potential for mutually beneficial
self-enforcing agreements. Id. at 288.
18. Several scholars have found that ratification of treaties is not consistently associated with
improved human rights performance, and in some cases may be associated with less respect for
human rights. See, e.g. Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, Respect for Human Rights: Law and
History (July 25, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2815272, Linda Camp
Keith, The United National International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a
Difference in Human Rights Behavior, 36 Journal of Peace Research (1999) 95-118 (finding that
ratification of human rights treaties is associated with less respect for human rights in practice);
Michael J. Gilligan and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Do Norms Reduce Torture? 38 Journal of Legal Studies
(2) (2009) 445-70 (finding "no evidence that the spreading of the international norm against torture,
measured by the percentage of countries in the world that have acceded to the United Nations
Convention against Torture, has led to any reduction in torture); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru
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studies, has identified several factors that the authors claim are associated
with treaty compliance. 1 9 Those factors include strong democratic institutions,
an active civil society,2 1 the nature of the human right being
protected, 22 an independent judiciary, 23 and whether such treaties have
become part of the national constitution.24 Other studies have explored how

Tsutsui & John Meyer, International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive
States and Human Rights Treaties, 23 Int'l Soc. 115 (2008). Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Make
a Difference?, 111 Yale L. J. 1937-2042 (2002) (analyzing five human rights treaties and finding that
none were consistently associated with improved human rights performance, and also finding that
treaty ratification was often a matter of public relations by ratifying countries which had no intention
of improving their human rights record).
19. The empirical methodology of some contributions to the treaty effectiveness literature has
been the subject of considerable criticism. One of the most notable critiques is Goodman and Jinks'
response to Oona Hathaway's Do Human Rights Make a Difference? (supra, note 17) in which
Hathaway concluded that treaty ratification is associated with worse human rights practices. While
Goodman and Jinks acknowledge that Hathaway's study was "the most well-conceived empirical
study of [treaty effectiveness] in the legal literature" at the time, they fault her for not taking into
account the various circumstances under which human rights norms are incorporated into state
behavior. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14
European Journal of International Law, 171 (2003). Simmons argues that much of the empirical
scholarship on treaty compliance suffers from problems that include selection, endogeneity of
treaties, and a state-centric focus that ignores the influence of non-state and sub-state actors in
influencing state behavior. See Simmons (2010) supra note 17.
20. See Oona Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. of Con. Res.
4 588, 593 (2007) ("where powerful actors can hold the government to account, international legal
commitments are more meaningful" and "human rights treaties are more likely to be effective where
there is domestic legal enforcement of treaty commitments").
21. See Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human
Rights?, 49 J. of Con. Res. 925, 951 (2005) ("in most cases, for treaty ratification to work, there must
be conditions for domestic groups, parties, and individuals and for civil society to persuade,
convince, and perhaps pressure governments into translating the formal promise of better human
rights protection into actual reality." See also Greg Shafer and Thomas Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn
in InternationalLegal Scholarship, 106 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 24 (2012) ("International human rights
treaties ... provide leverage for domestic mobilization to improve outcomes, but do not, on their
own, work well in the absence of domestic mobilization."); See also Sally Engel Merry, Human
Rights and Transnational Culture: Regulating Gender Violence Through Global Law, 44 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 53, 55 (2006) (finding that human rights law is more likely to be effective when non-state
actors function as intermediaries to interpret and adapt human rights norms to local contexts). See
also Margaret E. Keck And Kathryn Sikkink, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (finding a "boomerang effect" through which domestic NGOs whose
ability to influence their government is blocked reach out to international allies to bring pressure on
their states from outside. Id. at 12-13).
22. See Daniel Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. of
Pol. 4, 1161 (2010) (finding that states are less threatened by the right to be free from discrimination
protected by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and
therefore are more willing to comply with it than with the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, both of which are often asserted by political dissidents).
23. Linda Camp Keith, JudicialIndependence and Human Rights ProtectionAround the World, 85
JUDICATURE 195 (2002). See also Sandholtz, supra note 5.
24. See Elkins, et al., supra note 5 (analyzing data from 680 constitutional systems between 1789
and 2006 and concluding that the adoption of human rights norms into domestic constitutions
provides multiple monitors and alternatives through which to challenge government behavior, and
finding that one way in which human rights norms works is through incorporation into national
constitutions. Id. at 92.). See also Sandholtz, supra note 5. But see also Linda Camp Keith, Constitutional Provisionsfor Individual Human Rights (1997-1996): Are They More than Mere 'Window
Dressing'?,Political Research Quarterly 55(1): 111-143 (finding that among numerous constitutional
rights in national constitutions, only the right to a fair and public trial is associated with improved
rights in practice). In a related vein, international law scholars have noted the role of constitutional-
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international law (including international human rights law) affects national
behavior through a socialization process in which state actors assume the
beliefs and norms of others in their surrounding environment.
These studies have produced significant data suggesting a causal relationship between the factors listed above and states' human rights performance.2 6
In particular, the data suggests a correlation between constitutionalization
and the level of human rights protection in a given state.27 But constitutionalization has not always produced these results, and the large-scale quantitative
studies do not explain the circumstances under which such constitutionalization is (and is not) likely to improve such protection. Nor do these studies
show how cause lawyers have utilized constitutionalized treaty law in
attempting to heighten protection for their clients.
This critique is borne out by Beth Simmons, who, in her comprehensive
review of the treaty compliance literature, concludes that, "[T]he best
research moves away from unqualified claims and develops a nuanced
picture of how strategic as well as principled agents use treaties as toolssometimes successfully, sometimes not-to achieve their rights objectives."2 8 Such a nuanced study would certainly advance knowledge in the
subgenre of constitutionalized human rights law, which to date has focused
mostly on the linkage between ratification of human rights treaties and the
appearance of human rights provisions in national constitutions.2 9 What has
been less rigorously studied is how domestic and transnational non-state
actors utilize those constitutionalized treaty norms to attempt to alter state
behavior. Such studies are particularly important in what Simmons terms
"middle states"-i.e., partial or transitioning democracies, like Ecuador,

ized international law, and the courts and policy makers who engage with them, in creating a
"normatively progressive process of transnational norm convergence." See Marcelo Torelly, Transnational Legal Process and Fundamental Rights in Latin America: How Does the Inter- American
Human Rights System Reshape Domestic Constitutional Rights, in LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN
AMERICA: TRANSFORMING COURTS, RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS (Larissa Boratti, et al., eds.) (forthcoming 2016) (quoting Vicki Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL

ERA 8-9

(2010).
25. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 17 (identifying peer pressure, mimicry, identification, and
the search for status as some of the socializing factors that draw nations to incorporate human rights
norms). See also Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (concluding that "human rights can be enforced just as well through domestic and
transnational legal work as they can through international law"). Id. at 66.
26. See id.
27. Sandholtz, supra note 5 at 37-38. Sandholtz analyzed data related to 150 countries over 36
years to conclude that the constitutional status of treaty law is strongly associated with better human
rights performance. Sandholtz's analysis focused primarily on the ICCPR. In order to measure each
state's rights performance in areas covered by that treaty, he used data from the Freedom House Civil
Liberties score and the Political Terror Scale, which rates countries on the prevalence of political
disturbances, imprisonment, torture and murder. Id. at 34. While he found a strong association
between the constitutional status of treaty law (as well as judicial independence) and civil and
political rights performance, he found no association between such rights performance and ratification of the ICCPR. Id. at 36.
28. Simmons, supra note 17, at 292.
29. See Elkins, et al., supra note 5.
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where domestic actors have reason to press those norms in advancing their
cause. 30 In stable autocracies, Simmons notes, citizens have no means to
mobilize without being crushed, whereas in stable democracies they have
less need to mobilize around human rights norms because they are otherwise
protected under domestic law. 31 These more nuanced studies also provide an
opportunity to identify additional independent factors beyond ratification as
indicators of participation in human rights regimes.3 2
The recent efforts to strike down Decree 1182 in Ecuador provide an
opportunity for exactly this kind of research. In Simmons' parlance, Ecuador
is a "middle state," a partial democracy, featuring a democratically elected
but, at the time of events analyzed in this article, autocratic president who
frequently rules by executive decree and exerts significant control over both
the legislative and judicial branches, as well as civil society organizations.3 3
Thus, according to Simmons' prediction, we would expect human rights law
to be particularly important there. Moreover, Ecuador has many "principled
agents" (i.e., individuals and organizations who advocate for Colombian
refugees seeking asylum in Ecuador), based both domestically and internationally, who have used constitutionalized human rights law as tools-with
limited but nonetheless notable success-to achieve their rights objectives.
One group of principled agents that has received little attention in the
human rights treaty effectiveness literature to date is lawyers. While several
studies recognize the important contribution of civil society members (e.g.,
NGOs) in compelling state actors to comply with their treaty obligations, few
if any have specifically analyzed the role of lawyers, particularly in the
constitutional litigation context, and how their engagement with constitutionalized human rights law might impact treaty compliance. 34

30. Simmons, supra note 17, at 291.
31. Id.
32. See Shafer and Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 25 (noting that the impact of human rights treaties
is most likely to be seen in states "at the margins" that is, between autocratic and fully democratic
states).
33. Simmons, supra note 17. In April 2017, Lenin Moreno was elected President of Ecuador,
succeeding Rafael Correa. Morena had been Ecuador's Vice President and is a close ally of Correa.
See "In Ecuador, Lenin Moreno Headed for Victory in Presidential Election", New York Times, April
2, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/02/world/americas/lenn-moreno-ecuadorpresident-election.html.
34. See generally Martin Abregu and Christian Courtis, LA APLICACION DE LOS TRATADOS DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS POR LOS TRIBUNALES LOCALES, (1997); See also Stephen Meili, Staying Alive:

Public Interest Law in Contemporary Latin America, 9 International Review of Constitutionalism 43
(2009) [hereinafter Meili (2009)]. While both of these studies note the important role that lawyers can
play in enforcing human rights laws incorporated into many of the recently modified constitutions in
Latin American countries, they do not analyze that role in any specific cases. Moreover, while the
cause lawyering literature includes several studies of lawyers who seek to deploy human rights law in
a variety of transitioning democracies, none focus primarily on how these lawyers' use constitutionalized human rights law in their advocacy. See, e.g. Stephen Ellman, Cause Lawyering in the Third
World, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin
Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, eds., 1998) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING (1998)] at 349-430;
Stephen Meili, Cause Lawyering and Social Movements: A Comparative Perspective on Democratic
Change in Argentina and Brazil, in CAUSE LAWYERING (1998) at 487-522. And although
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On the other hand, the literature that analyzes lawyers who advocate on the
basis of moral or political commitments is extensive.35 Early studies focused
on the work of lawyers in the United States who pursued a rights-based
strategy in defending clients whose claims were based on violations of civil
liberties and entitlement to social welfare benefits. 36 Other studies have
highlighted the public interest work of lawyers in large U.S. law firms, as
well as the gradual acceptance of public interest law by the U.S. legal
establishment. By
The analytical and geographic scope of scholarship on such lawyers
increased dramatically with the publication of five volumes on cause lawyering edited by Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold between 1998 and 2008. 3"
These volumes include studies of cause lawyers in a variety of practice sites
around the world who employ numerous strategies, including litigation,
legislative advocacy, grass-roots community organizing and interactions
with social movements. 39 Recognizing that cause lawyering can involve
advocacy across the political spectrum, and for a multitude of causes,
Scheingold and Sarat conclude that "at its core, cause lawyering is about
using legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client service-be
those ideals social, cultural, political, economic, or, indeed, legal." 40

Simmons has recognized the growth in human rights litigation in recent years, she asserts that
whether such litigation is an effective means of achieving real improvement in rights practices
remains an open question. Beth A. Simmons, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 129-35 (2009).

35. For a summary of this literature, see Anna-Maria Marshall and Daniel Crocker Hale, Cause
Lawyering, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 10:301 20 (2014); see also Christos Boukalas Politicsas Legal
Action/ Lawyers as Political Actors: Towards a Reconceptualisation of Cause Lawyering, 22(3)
Social & Legal Studies 395 (2013); see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause and
Experiences from Abroad, 94 CAL. L. REV. 575-615, 579 (2005). Scholars have used a variety of
terms to describe such lawyers, including radical, progressive, rebellious, transformative, critical,
socially conscious, alternative, political, visionary and activist. See Carrie Menkel Meadow, The
Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social
Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING (1998), supra note 34, at 33.
36. See Stuart Scheingold, Radical Lawyers and SocialistIdeals, 15 J. LAW & SOCIETY 122 (1998).
37. See Robert Kagan and Robert Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice,
73 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985); Jerold Auerbach, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA (1976); David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
38. See CAUSE LAWYERING (1998), supra note 34; CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL

ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING (2001)]; THE
WORLD CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005); CAUSE LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006); THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE

LAWYERS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2008). In a review of the fourth of these five
volumes, Debra Schleef observed that Sarat and Scheingold had "virtually cornered the market" on
cause lawyering. See Debra Schleef, Book Note, Cause Lawyers and Social Movements by Austin
Sarat and StuartA. Scheingold, 41 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 503 (June 2007).
39. See CAUSE LAWYERING (1998), supra note 34; CAUSE LAWYERING (2001), supra note 38; THE
WORLD CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE, supra note 38; CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note
38; THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS, supra note 38.

40. Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 9, at 3. Scholars have struggled mightily to come up with a
way to define cause lawyers that distinguishes them from other types of lawyers. Thomas Hillbink
identifies three different types of cause lawyers: proceduralists, whose "cause" is the rule of law
rather than any particular moral or political conviction; vanguard/elite lawyers, who view law as a
superior form of politics and believe that changes in substantive law can change society in ways
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Cause lawyering scholarship has been criticized for focusing almost
exclusively on cause lawyers as opposed to cause lawyering. In their recent
critique of the cause lawyering literature, Anne-Marie Marshall and Daniel
Crocker Hale note that while individual studies of cause lawyers have created
a rich set of descriptive narratives about individual cause lawyers, they leave
the field of cause lawyering under-theorized.4 2 In laying the groundwork for
such a theory, Marshall and Hale suggest a framework of three distinct yet
overlapping contexts within which examples of cause lawyering should be
analyzed: the degree to which the cause is organized, the settings in which
cause lawyering is practiced, and the surrounding legal and political environment.4 3 The authors assert that interactions between these contexts will
address questions regarding the relationship between law and movements for
social change.44

commensurate with their political views; and grassroots lawyers, whose primary concern is not with
the health of the legal system but with the interests of the client. Thomas Hillbink, You Know the
Type... Categoriesof Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 657 (July 2004). Other scholars are
skeptical of categorizing any particular category of lawyers as cause lawyers, preferring to focus on
the practices of representation in certain contexts rather than assuming that there exists a set of
conditions which must be met for those practices to become the activity of lawyers working for a
cause. See Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinsky, Destruction of House and Construction of a Cause:
Lawyers and Bedouins in the Israeli Courts, in CAUSE LAWYERING 1998, supra note 34, at
230-31. Others have noted that given the difficulty in conceptually separating cause lawyers from
other lawyers, the moniker of "cause lawyers" threatens to become the exception that swallowed the
rule. See Scott L. Cummings, The Future of PublicInterestLaw, 33 U. ARK. L.R. L. REV. 355, 369-70
(2011). Cummings also worries that the "big tent" approach to the definitional scope of cause
lawyering has shifted the discussion away from the social legitimacy of different types of advocacy
groups by suggesting their moral equivalence. Id. at 370.
41. Marshall & Hale, supra note 35. A similar criticism has been directed at studies of other
categories of lawyers. See, e.g. Sida Liu, Client Influence and the Contingency of Professionalism:
The Work of Elite Corporate Lawyers in China, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 751, 753 (2006) ("After
Smigel's classic study of Wall Street lawyers, research on the structure of the bar flourished [citations
omitted], but there have been fewer studies of lawyers' professional work."). Sarat and Scheingold
themselves seemed to have noticed this deficiency in the cause lawyering literature, as they have
urged scholars to "attend to the complex political and professional terrain on which [cause lawyering]
occurs." Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 9, at 3.
42. Marshall & Hale, supra note 35, at 302. Christos Boukalas has also asserted that the cause
lawyering field is under-theorized, noting that its binary distinctions between liberal and non-liberal
cause lawyers, law and politics, and law and the state have precluded a thoroughgoing analysis of the
shifting dynamics between these elements and their influence on cause lawyering. Boukalas, supra
note 35. While Boukalas acknowledges that many individual studies address such shifting dynamics
in an ad hoc fashion, he proposes a more conscious effort to explore these shifting dynamics in order
to better understand the sociopolitical context of cause lawyering. Id. at 414-15. In another criticism
of the cause lawyering literature, Jayanth Krishnan argues that not enough of it analyzes why cause
lawyers invoke the rhetoric of constitutional litigation, i.e., why they frame their legal arguments to
conform to constitutional language. Krishnan, supra note 35. The conventional wisdom is that this
strategy comes from the lawyers themselves, but Krishnan's study suggests that in certain situations
the constitutional framing pressure can come from grass roots organizations. In the study resulting in
this article, there is no dispute that the impetus for the constitution-based arguments on behalf of
Colombian refugees came from lawyers (both within and outside Ecuador) rather than from grass
roots organizations. Id.
43. Marshall & Hale, supra note 35, at 303. An additional factor which Marshall and Hale do not
explicitly identify is how cause lawyers adapt their tactics to the particular political and legal context
within which they operate. My thanks to Herbert Kritzer for this insight.
44. Id. at 302.
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This article fits within the framework recommended by Marshall and Hale.
It analyzes the ways in which cause lawyers navigated the legal and political
environment in Ecuador to advance the cause of access to justice for
asylum-seekers in that country. By focusing on the efforts of national and
transnational cause lawyers representing non-citizens in litigation based on
constitutionalized human rights norms before the Ecuadoran Constitutional
Court, this article will consider several questions relevant to both the treaty
effectiveness and cause lawyering bodies of literature:
* What factors in the constitutional litigation setting in a "middle state"
may affect the likelihood that cause lawyers challenging state policy
toward non-citizens will improve rights outcomes for their clients?
* What are the trade-offs for lawyers representing non-citizens in
constitutional litigation where the compelling and overriding purpose
of their work is to provide access to the state in order to secure
international protection from persecution? That is, do cause lawyers
sacrifice longer term, social movement gains in order to establish (or
re-establish) constitutionalized human rights protections that have
been diminished or eliminated by state policy?
* How does the underlying political and legal context shape the
strategic choices cause lawyers make when representing non-citizens?
Answering these questions will advance knowledge on human rights treaty
effectiveness and cause lawyering. Rather than making unqualified claims of
treaty effectiveness based on quantitative studies, this article highlights the
circumstances under which cause lawyers have actually used international
human rights treaty law as tools, with partial success, to achieve their rights
objectives. And rather than merely describing the work of cause lawyers who
challenged Decree 1182 before the Ecuadoran Constitutional Court, this
article analyzes how those lawyers attempted to achieve a positive rightsbased outcome for their clients within a national political and legal context
that included an autocratic executive, a historically non-independent judiciary, and a human rights-laden constitution.

III. METHODOLOGY
This article is a case study of some of the circumstances under which the
constitutionalization of international human rights law may increase the
likelihood of positive rights outcomes for non-citizens. The article focuses on
Ecuador because it is a "middle state"; i.e., a fledgling democracy, featuring
some of the characteristics which the relevant literature asserts are associated
with improved human rights performance following human rights treaty
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ratification: democratic institutions, 45 an active civil society,4 6 and constitutionalized treaty law.4 7 For this reason, this article qualifies as a "crucial case
study" because it can confirm or challenge the theory that the constitutionalization of human rights law leads to better human rights outcomes. 48 If
constitutionalized human rights law can improve rights outcomes for noncitizens in Ecuador, it is likely to do so in other "middle states."49
Moreover, the article focuses on a particular series of events in Ecuadorthe litigation over Decree 1182-in order to identify factors relevant to the
effective utilization of constitutionalized human rights norms by cause
lawyers challenging limitations on the rights of non-citizens.5 0 In this way, it
answers the call for nuanced studies of principled actors (here, cause
lawyers) seeking positive human rights outcomes in states at the margins
between fully autocratic and fully democratic states. 5 1 It also arrests the trend
toward merely descriptive accounts of cause lawyers in various settings.5 2
The empirical data for this article consists of 15 semi-structured interviews, both in person and via Skype, with lawyers who worked for the four
organizations that litigated the Constitutional Court challenge to Decree

45. See infra Part III.A.
46. See infra Part III.B.
47. See infra Part III.C.
48. See Harry Eckstein, Case Studies and Theory in Political Science, in CASE STUDY METHOD:
KEY ISSUES, KEY TEXTS 119, 148 (Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley & Peter Foster eds., 2000)
(describing a crucial case as one "that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the
theory's validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed"). Single
case studies have been criticized for a variety of reasons, most notably because their findings cannot
be generalized. See G.R. KING, ROBERT KEOHANE & S. VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994). However, single case studies retain value in analytic
generalization, as opposed to statistical generalization. See John Gerring Is There a (Viable) Crucial
Case Method?, 40 COMp.POL. STUD. 231, 231-25 (Mar. 2007). Moreover, single case studies are best
viewed in conjunction with cross-case studies. Id. at 249. As noted later in this article, there is a need
for additional nuanced studies of principled actors employing constitutionalized human rights law in
seeking to improve rights outcomes for non-citizens.
49. Id.
50. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 17 (41h.Ed.) (2009) ("The
essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate
a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what
result.").
51. See Elkins, et al., supra note 5; Simmons, supra note 17, at 292.
52. See Marshall & Hale, supra note 35. This article is not, however, an analysis of the long-term
judicial impact of the Constitutional Court's 2014 decision on Decree 1182. The extensive literature
on judicial impact focuses on several elements of impact, including the electoral incentives of elites,
the ability of courts to drive change, and the role of civil society actors in the judicial process. See,
e.g., Cesar Rodrfguez Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669 (Nov. 2011); Octavio L. Ferraz, Health
Inequalities, Rights, and Courts: The Social Impact of the "Judicializationof Health," in Brazil, in
LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 1 (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri
Gloppen eds., 2011); MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); EZEQUIEL GONZALEZ OCANTOS, THE COLLAPSE
OF IMPUNITY REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA: LEGAL CULTURES, STRATEGIC

LITIGATION AND JUDICIAL

BEHAVIOR (2012). While this article touches on each of these factors, the Decree 1182 decision was
issued too recently to support a full analysis of its impact, which is likely to continue to unfold well
into the future.
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1182, as well as other lawyers familiar with the litigation.5 3 Key informants
in Ecuador helped identify lawyers that fit this criteria.5 4
These interviews were included in the study in order to analyze how
lawyers in the litigation over Decree 1182 encouraged state actors (i.e., the
Ecuadoran Constitutional Court) to comply with constitutionalized human
rights treaty law. The lawyers' views about how to bring about a positive
rights outcome in that litigation contextualizes this study's other findings
regarding the Ecuadoran legal and political context surrounding the Decree
1182 litigation. Because the lawyers in this study all have the same professional specialization and detailed knowledge of the Decree 1182 litigation,
the number of interviews planned for this study is sufficient to reach thematic
saturation: the point at which no new themes are likely to emerge. 5

IV.

BACKGROUND CONTEXT

The political context within which cause lawyers engaged with constitutionalized human rights law in the litigation over Decree 1182 consists of
several factors: a strong executive, a historically weak judiciary, an active yet
intimidated NGO community reluctant to challenge the executive, a burgeoning refugee crisis, and a recently revised, rights-laden constitution. Each of
these factors is described in more detail below.
A.

A Strong Executive and a Non-Independent Judiciary

President Rafael Correa, first elected in 2007 as part of his self-described
"Citizens' Revolution," blended populism and autocracy in a way that many
observers have likened to former President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. 6

53. The organizations that filed the case in chief were Asylum Access Ecuador, the Quito-based
branch of an international NGO headquartered in San Francisco, California, and the Law Clinic of the
Universidad de San Francisco, based in Quito [hereinafter "USF Quito Clinic"]. Both of these
organizations are staffed with Ecuadoran attorneys. An amicus brief was jointly filed by Human
Rights Watch and the Human Rights and Atrocity Prevention Clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law in New York [hereinafter "Cardozo Clinic"]. In addition to the nine lawyers who
worked on the litigation, I interviewed five lawyers employed by refugee-rights NGOs and
governmental agencies in Ecuador who are familiar with the Decree 1182 litigation. I also met with
the Ministry of Human Mobility and several members of her staff. All interviews were conducted in
English or with a Spanish-speaking translator, in Quito or via Skype, between July 2015 and February
2016.
54. See GEOFFREY PAYNE & JUDY PAYNE, KEY CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 135 (2004) ("A key
informant is simply someone who, by virtue of his [sic] particular position in the society, knows a
great deal about the subject of the research. It may be that his expertise is to know who knows, so that
he refers the research worker to others more knowledgeable than himself.").
55. See Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce & Laura Johnson, How Many Interviews Are Enough?: An
Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability, 18 FIELD METHODS 59, 64 65 (2006) (defining
"[t]heoretical saturation" as the point at which "all of the main variations of the phenomenon have
been identified and incorporated into the emerging theory"). Guest et al. conclude that for studies
with a high level of homogeneity among the studied population, a sample of as few as six interviews
may suffice to enable development of meaningful themes and useful interpretations. Id. at 78.
56. See Jose R. Cardenas, The Chavez Model Threatens Ecuador,AM. ENTERPRISES INST.FOR PUB.
POL'Y. RES., Mar. 2011, at 1 ("While Correa may not share Chavez's flamboyant governing style, he

360

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:347

Benefitting from the wealth created by Ecuador's oil reserves, he instituted
many social programs that made him very popular with certain segments of
the population. 7 At the same time, Correa consolidated power in the
executive branch and retaliated against those in the media and general public
who criticized him.5 8 He intimidated many of his opponents into silence.
Ecuador's previous constitution did not allow presidents to serve for successive terms, but the 2008 Constitution, the formation of which Correa exerted
significant control over, eliminated that restriction. 9
Correa continued, and many say exacerbated, Ecuador's tradition of
executive control over the judiciary. During the debate over judicial reforms
soon after he was elected, he famously stated that "we will stick our noses
into the justice system. ' 60 In 2011 he established an ad hoc commission, the
Transnational Judicial Council, which was authorized to hire, fire, and
reappoint judges at all levels across Ecuador. By 2014, the Council, headed
by Correa's former Justice Minister, had removed 254 judges from their
positions. 61
Even before Correa took office, Ecuador had one of the least independent
and most unstable judiciaries in Latin America, a region known historically

most assuredly shares his objective of radically transforming his country and his methods of using the
tools of democracy to undermine its foundations and subjugate the rule of law to his personal whims.
In addition to their messianic zeal, the two leaders also share a lust for power, an intolerance of
criticism..."); See also Jamie Daremblum, Why Ecuador Matters, HUDSON INST. (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.hudson.org/research/9500-why-ecuador-matters
("Correa is a classic populist demagogue who has followed the autocratic playbook of his Venezuelan mentor and used Ecuador's oil
wealth to maintain a high approval rating. Immediately after taking office, he formed a constituent
assembly that rewrote the Ecuadorean constitution and massively expanded presidential power.").
57. Marc Becker, The Stormy Relations between Rafael Correa and Social Movements in Ecuador,
40 LATIN AM. PERSP. 43, 43-44 (May 2013).
58. See World Report 2015: Ecuador, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2015), https://www.hrw.org/world-reportU
2015/country-chapters/Ecuador (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (documenting various human rights abuses
by the Correa regime, including criminal defamation prosecutions and administration sanctions
against critical journalists and media outlets, aggressive efforts to discredit human rights advocates
within the country, and excessive use of force in quelling demonstrations). See also Editorial,
Ecuador's Autocrat Cracks Down on Media Freedom, WASH. POST (July 28, 2011), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/ecuadors-autocrat-cracks-down-on-media-freedom/2011/07/27/gIQA5
BRtflstory.html (noting that the Ecuadoran government controlled one radio station when Correa
became president in 2007, but by 2011 owned five televisions channels, four radio stations, two
newspapers, and four magazines); Becker, supra note 51, at 43 (noting the criticism of U.S. news
outlets toward Ecuador's, including the observation that it has conducted "the most comprehensive
and ruthless assault on free media under way in the Western Hemisphere").
59. According to Osvaldo Hurtado, a former president of Ecuador, "The yearning of all autocrats
is to stay in power for life, and that was Correa's plan from the start." See Mercedes Alvaro & Dan
Molinski, Ecuador PresidentRafael Correa Seeks Law Allowing PerpetualRe-Election, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ecuador-president-rafael-correa-seeks-law-allowingperpetual-re-election- 1408395511.
60. See Luis Pasara, Judicial Independence in Ecuador'sJudicial Reform Process, DUE PROCESS
OF L. FOUND. 8 (2014), http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/indjud-ecuador-executivereport-eng.
pdf.
61. Noah O'Connor, Situation of Judicial Independence in Ecuador, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Oct. 30,
2014), http://hrbrief.org/2014/10/situation-of-judicial-independence-in-ecuador/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2016).
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for weak judiciaries overall.62 Between 1985 and 2008 it experienced more
attacks from the other branches of government than any other country in the
region, by far.63 According to the World Justice Rule of Law Project, Ecuador
ranks 7 7 th out of 102 countries (and 1 3th out of 16 in Latin America) in
adherence to the rule of law, and scored below average on most measures of
judicial independence, including corruption within the judiciary and effective
judicial limits on government power.64 Numerous academics and lawyers
interviewed for a comprehensive study of judicial independence around the
world considered the lack of judicial independence and the corruption within
the Ecuadoran judiciary are "very serious" problems in Ecuador.65
The imbalance of power between the executive and judicial branches of
government in Ecuador is reflected in the relative authority they wield under
the 2008 Constitution. The Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) ranks
the world's constitutions according to a number of indicia, including Executive Power and Judicial Independence. For Ecuador, the CCP assigned a
score of seven (out of seven) for Executive Power and a two (out of six) for
Judicial Independence. 6 6 The 2008 Constitution thus further institutionalizes
the historic dominance of the executive over the judiciary in Ecuador.6 7
The Constitutional Court, whose decision on Decree 1182 is the focus of
this article, reflects this lack of independence. Originally created in 1996, the
Constitutional Court (called the Constitutional Tribunal at the time) was

62. Santiago Basabe-Serrano, Determinants of the Quality of Justice in Latin America: Comparative Analysis of the Ecuadorian Case from a Sub-national Perspective, 35 JUST. SYS. J. 104, 108
(2014). For studies of judiciaries in Latin America generally, see Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden &
Alan Angell, eds. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (2009). Even after
judicial reforms in numerous Latin American countries, including Ecuador, over the past two
decades, a lack of judicial independence persists. See Pasara, supra note 55.
63. Gretchen Helmke & Jeffrey K. Staton, The Puzzling Judicial Politics of Latin America: A
Theory of Litigation, Judicial Decisions, and Interbranch Conflict, in CTS. IN LATIN AM. 306, 309-10
(Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa eds., 2011). These attacks included attempts, successful or
otherwise, by executives and/or legislatures to impeach, dissolve, or strip the jurisdiction of a
country's high court or courts. Id.
64. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2015 (2015), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/
default/files/documents/roli_2015_0.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Constitution Rankings, supra note 14. (last visited August 8, 2017). By way of comparison, the
United States received a score of 1 for Executive Power and 3 for Judicial Independence. The CCP's
Executive Power index reflects the constitutional presence or absence of seven aspects of executive
lawmaking: (1) the power to initiate legislation; (2) the power to issue decrees; (3) the power to
initiate constitutional amendments; (4) the power to declare states of emergency; (5) veto power; (6)
the power to challenge the constitutionality of legislation; and (7) the power to dissolve the
legislature. The judicial independence index reflects the constitutional presence or absence of six
features thought to enhance judicial independence: (1) whether the constitution contains an explicit
statement of judicial independence; (2) whether the constitution provides that judges have lifetime
appointments; (3) whether appointments to the highest court involve either a judicial council or two
(or more) actors; (4) whether removal is prohibited or limited so that it requires the proposal of a
supermajority vote in the legislature, or if only the public or judicial council can propose removal and
another political actor is required to approve such a proposal; (5) whether removal explicitly limited
to crimes and other issues of misconduct, treason, or violations of the constitution; and (6) whether
judicial salaries are protected from reduction. Id.
67. The Ecuadorean legislature also scores comparatively low on the Legislative Power indicia in
the CCP database. Id.
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limited to deciding whether a particular law was constitutional. 68 Between
1999 and 2007 none of the Constitutional Court's judges finished the
four-year term to which they were elected. 69 During this time, there were four
episodes of wholesale removal of judges and court restructuring. 70 The
Constitutional Tribunal was eliminated by the 2008 Constitution and replaced with the Constitutional Court. Its powers were broadened to include
interpretation of the law and creation of jurisprudence. 1 It is now the
supreme authority on constitutional questions within Ecuador.72 However,
while the 2008 Constitution includes an elaborate process for the selection of
judges in order to insure their independence, observers note that the executive has nevertheless been able to continue its dominance of the Court.73 One
of the lawyers who represented the refugees in the Decree 1182 litigation
before the Constitutional Court sounded the same theme: "the Constitutional
Court in Ecuador decides its cases ... mostly on political criteria. 74
B.

An Intimidated Civil Society

Ecuador has historically boasted an active and influential civil society. Its
NGOs have had an impact on government policy on a range of issues,

68. Santiago Basabe-Serrano, Judges without Robes and Judicial Voting in Contexts of Institutional Instability: The Case of Ecuador's Constitutional Court, 1999 2007, 44 J. LATIN AM. STUD.
127, 136-37 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter "Basabe-Serrano (2012)"]. This limited jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court is not unusual, as most countries' constitutional courts have jurisdiction to hear
only constitutional questions. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Strugglefor the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe, 154 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1757, 1761 62 (2006). In contrast, of the 80 to 100 reasoned opinions that the United States
Supreme Court generally issues each year, usually fewer than half of them have to do with
constitutional questions. See David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional
Courts, in COMp. CONST. L. 624, 624 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011), http://scholarship.
law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article-1637&context-faculty-publications. For a more general
description of the Ecuadoran legal system, see Rodrigo Bermeo, Ecuador,in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002).
69. Basabe-Serrano (2012), supra note 68, at 137.
70. Id. at 138-142. See also Shimon Shetreet, CreatingA Culture of Judicial Independence: The
PracticalChallenge and the Conceptual and ConstitutionalInfrastructure, THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 24 (Shimon Shetreet &
Christopher Forsyth ed., 2011).
71. Basabe-Serrano (2012), supra note 68, at 136-37.
72. Ecuadoran Constitution, Article 124.
73. Pasara, supra note 60. This view was echoed by several of the lawyers interviewed for this
article. One of them noted that all of the Constitutional court judges had some link to President
Correa. Indeed, constitutional courts are often politicized, as they are frequently charged with
reviewing the constitutionality of the conduct of the other branches of government. See Danielle E.
Finck, JudicialReview: The United States Supreme Court Versus the German Constitutional Court,
20 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 123 (1997). For this reason, constitutional courts are typically
cautious about the number of cases they take on, especially following a period of political upheaval,
lest they create too many enemies. See Fontana, supranote 68.
74. The Ecuadoran Constitutional Court's lack of independence is not unique among constitutional courts. Given that such courts frequently adjudicate political issues, they are reticent to take on
cases likely to offend powerful governmental interests, especially in their early years or after
significant political change. See Fontana, supra note 68; Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira,
Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: A Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 99 (Jan. 2006), http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law-globalstudies/vol5/issl/5.
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including rural technical assistance, disability services, family planning,
education, and social movements such as women's rights, environmental
rights, and indigenous rights.75 While civil society organizations devoted to
refugee issues are relatively new, given the paucity of refugees in the country
prior to 2000, their numbers have increased over the past 15 years. 76 The
2008 Constitution explicitly recognizes and promotes the role of civil society
organizations in influencing public policy and monitoring all levels of
government.77
On the other hand, President Correa significantly curtailed the independence and influence of civil society, as he assumed the power to shut down
NGOs that ran afoul of his administration. In 2013, Correa issued Decree 16
(since renamed Decree 739), which created an agency called the National
Secretary of Politics Management, which is "responsible for regulating the
fulfillment of the objectives and activities of social and civil organizations." 78 Under Decree 739, the executive branch may dissolve any social
organization that "deviates from the goals and objectives for which it was
created.", 79 Moreover, it may shut down any organization that engages in
activities that "compromise public peace" or "interfere with public policies
that undermine national[ ... ] security of the state." 80
Decree 739 was not an empty threat: in December 2013 the government
dissolved the environmental advocacy foundation, Pachamama, which had
been in existence for 16 years, on the grounds that it was not "fulfilling its
objectives" and that it was "acting like a political party that affects the
internal security of the state as well as public peace. '81 The climate of

75. Susan Appe, A Civil Society Network's Response to Regulatory Policy in Post-neoliberal
Ecuador, 1 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL 16, 5 (2015).
76. There are numerous organizations within Ecuador who provide direct services, such as food,
clothing, shelter and medicine to refugees. The only organization that provides legal services to
refugees is Asylum Access Ecuador (AAE). AAE also provides direct services to refugees.
77. Article 96 of the 2008 Ecuadoran Constitution states, "All forms of organizing society are
recognized as an expression of the people's sovereignty to develop processes of self-determination
and to influence public decisions and policymaking and for social monitoring of all levels of
government, as well as public and private institutions that provide public services. Organizations can
be articulated at different levels to build up citizen power and its forms of expression; they must
guarantee internal democracy, the rotation of power of their leaders, and accountability."
78. Decree 16, Art. 10 (Ecuador). Decree 16 has been retitled Decree 739, following minor
modifications. See Reglamento Sistema Unificado Informacion de Organizaciones Sociales, Decreto
Ejecutivo 739, Registro Oficial 570 (Aug. 21, 2015) (Ecuador). Article 739 does not apply to
educational institutions, which are governed by a different law. See Ley Organica Educacion
Superior, Ley 0, Registro Oficial Suplemento 298 (Oct. 12, 2010) (Ecuador). The education law sets
academic standards but does not regulate the political activity of educational institutions, such as law
school clinics.
79. Decree 739, Art. 22(2) (Ecuador).
80. Decree 739, Art. 22(6). A subsequent decree (No. 355, issued in July 2014) ordered that any
organization that failed to provide information to the government regarding its activities would be
declared "inactive." One lawyer who works for a consortium of NGOs that advocate for refugees told
me that one must be very careful about what he or she says in Ecuador, lest the government
characterize that person as a terrorist. Interview 6.
81. NGO Law Monitor: Ecuador, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW (Dec. 15,

2015), http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/ecuador.html. Members of Pachamama had participated
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intimidation created by Decree 739 has caused many NGOs to refrain from
any activity that might be perceived as challenging the government.8 2 One
lawyer who works with a coalition of refugee NGOs in Ecuador described
the results of this intimidation:
In past years, our group [made] legal reports [critical of the government], and now these organizations have a lot of fear. They say we have
to be very polite, don't look for conflict. [We need to do] silent work.
With the 8press
we have to be very careful with our words in an
3
interview.
As this statement indicates, Ecuadoran civil society became less robust in
the Correa era due to its advocacy efforts being curtailed by threats of
government retaliation. 84
C.

The 2008 Constitution

As noted earlier in this article, Ecuador's 2008 Constitution contains more
human rights provisions than any other country in the world.85 In addition, it

in a public demonstration outside a hotel in Quito where government officials were reviewing license
applications filed by several foreign companies seeking to explore for oil in the Ecuadoran Amazon.
EnvironmentalNGO Shut Down by PresidentialDecree in Ecuador, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (12 Dec.
2013), https://www.ifex.org/ecuador/2013/12/12/ecuador-rights-group/. The Correa government
claimed that the demonstration had turned violent when protestors assaulted the Chilean ambassador
to Ecuador and a Belarusian corporate executive. Id.
82. Several of the lawyers interviewed for this article indicated that their litigation strategy over
Decree 1182 was altered as a direct result of this intimidation. For example, Asylum Access Ecuador,
the only Ecuador-based NGO involved in the litigation, chose to focus only on what it termed the
administrative parts of the Decree (i.e., the shortening of the time to file an asylum claim intentionally
and the narrowing of the refugee definition). The USF Quito Clinic, which is not subject to Decree
739, challenged the authenticity of the Decree itself on the grounds that it exceeded the president's
powers under the Constitution. All of the lawyers involved in the litigation viewed the latter position
as far more challenging to Correa's authority.
83. Interview 6.
84. Correa's intimidation of his critics extended beyond Decree 739. He frequently used the
media, including a weekly Saturday television show, to criticize and verbally abuse NGOs and other
civil society actors who oppose his policies, characterizing them as political pawns that were being
used against him and his government. Ecuador: Clampdown on Civil Society, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/12/ecuador-clampdown-civil-society.
Correa,
who is limited to two terms in office by the Ecuadoran Constitution, will be leaving office once the
results of the 2017 presidential elections are finalized.
85. Constitutional Rankings, supra note 14. Ecuador's 2008 Constitution is one of the more
obvious manifestations of the "Citizens' Revolution," which brought Rafael Correa to power in early
2007. In addition to a plethora of rights for individuals and even for Nature, the Constitution grants
broad powers to the Executive to implement his or her agenda. See Joshua Partlow and Stephan
Kflffner, Voters in EcuadorApprove Constitution, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/28/AR2008092802644.html. This abundance of
rights combined with expanded Presidential power has led one critic to observe that the 2008
Constitution adheres to the "rule of rights" rather than the "rule of law." See DANIELA SALAZAR, MY
POWER IN THE CONSTITUTION: THE PERVERSION OF RULE OF LAW IN ECUADOR 12, https://www.law.yale.
edu/system/files/documents/pdf/SELA15_SalazarCVEng.pdf. According to Salazar, when this
approach is combined with all the powers the Constitution gives to the executive (through decrees
and the like), it results in excessive executive power to determine who is permitted to exercise those
rights. In her view, this rights-heavy approach has allowed the President to become the "exclusive
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incorporates all international human rights instruments (not merely those
86
which Ecuador has ratified or otherwise acceded to) into its domestic law.
Moreover, it declares that international treaties ratified by Ecuador (and thus
incorporated into its Constitution) have preeminence over any conflicting
laws and Constitutional provisions.8 7
With respect to the rights of non-citizens and universal citizenship in
particular, Article 11(2) states that all persons are equal, and protects all
persons (i.e., not only Ecuadoran citizens) from discrimination on the basis
of numerous categories, including "ethnic belonging, place of birth ... cultural identity ... [or] migratory status." 8 8
Such declarations of universal citizenship, equality and prohibitions against
discrimination have roots in various international human rights instruments.89 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), each of which was ratified

legislator" in Ecuador. Id. at 21. Of course, Ecuador is not alone in including numerous human rights
norms in the most recent version of its Constitution. Since the late 1970s, several Latin American
countries have incorporated human rights treaties into their Constitutions. See Ariel Dulitzky, LA
APLICACION DE LOS TRATADOS DOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS POR LOS TRIBUNALS LOCALES: UN STUDIO
COMPARADO 33-74 (1997). See also Meili (2009), supranote 34.
86. Article 11(3) declares that "the rights and freedoms set forth in the Constitution and
international human rights instruments" are enforceable by any Ecuadoran "civil, administrative or
judicial servant." By affording constitutional status to international human rights law, the Ecuadoran
Constitution creates an institutional structure that encourages convergence between domestic and
international precedent (primarily from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) on human rights
issues. See Torelly, supra note 24, at 9.
87. Article 124 states, "The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and prevails over any other
legal regulatory framework. The standards and acts of public power must be upheld in conformity
with the provisions of the Constitution; otherwise, they shall not be legally binding. The Constitution
and international human rights treaties ratified by the State that recognize rights that are more
favorable than those enshrined in the Constitution shall prevail over any other legal regulatory system
or action by public power."
88. Articles 11 (1) and 11 (2) of the Ecuadoran Constitution state, in full: "(1) All persons are equal
and shall enjoy the same rights, duties and opportunities. (2) No one shall be discriminated against for
reasons of ethnic belonging, place of birth, age, sex, gender identity, cultural identity, civil status,
language, religion, ideology, political affiliation, legal record, socio-economic condition, migratory
status, sexual orientation, health status, HIV carrier, disability, physical difference or any other
distinguishing feature, whether personal or collective, temporary or permanent, which might be
aimed at or result in the diminishment or annulment of recognition, enjoyment or exercise of rights.
All forms of discrimination are punishable by law. The State shall adopt affirmative action measures
that promote real equality for the benefit of the rights-bearers who are in a situation of inequality"
(emphasis added).
89. The 2008 Constitution's emphasis on the rights of non-citizens reflects the era in which it was
enacted. As a result of a severe economic downturn and political instability that saw eight presidents
assume office between 1995 and 2005, Ecuador experienced a massive out-migration of nearly 20%
of its economically active population. Ana Margheritis, "Todos Somos Migrantes" (We Are All
Migrants): The Paradoxes of Innovative State-led Transnationalism in Ecuador, 5 INT. J. POL.
SOCIOLOGY. (2011) 198-217, 203-04. In his campaign for President, Correa declared that his
administration would be the "migrant's government," hoping to lure expatriate Ecuadorans home, and
also to encourage the nations to which they emigrated (most prominently Spain and the United States)
to respect those expatriates' rights. Id., at 206. Indeed, Correa saw the human rights discourse in his
campaign as a way to strengthen the identity of his political coalition. Id.
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or acceded to by Ecuador, recognize the equality of all persons. 90 The
ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the ACHR all prohibit discrimination on the basis
of several specific categories, including race, national origin, birth, or "other
status." 91

In addition to its protection of the fundamental human rights of equality
and non-discrimination, the Ecuadoran Constitution includes several provisions relevant to the right of asylum. For example, article 41 recognizes the
right to asylum "in accordance with ... international human rights instruments.",92 The inclusiveness of this provision means that it incorporates
instruments such as the Cartagena Declaration, which broadens the scope of
asylum to include persons fleeing generalized violence.9 3 Moreover, Article

90. Ecuador ratified the ICCPR in 1969 and the ACHR in 1977. It was also among the members of
the UN General Assembly who voted to adopt the UDHR in 1948. Article 1 of the UDHR states, "All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Article 26 of the ICCPR
states, "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
Article 24 of the ACHR states, "All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled,
without discrimination, to equal protection of the law."
91. Article 2, Section 2 of the ICCPR states, "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
Article 2, Section 2 of the ICESCR states, "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination
of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status." Article 1, Section 1 of the ACHR states, "The States Parties to
this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without
any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition." And while the UDHR
does not specific categories of prohibited discrimination, its Article 7 does prohibit discrimination
more broadly: "All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of
this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination."
92. Article 41 of the Ecuadoran Constitution states, "Their rights to asylum and sanctuary are
recognized, in accordance with the law and international human rights instruments." It is noteworthy
that this provision guarantees the right to asylum and not merely the right to seek asylum, which is
contained in human rights instruments such as the UDHR and the ACHR.
93. Under Article I(A)(2) of the 1951 U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to obtain
asylum, a person must demonstrate a "well-founded fear" of being persecuted in her home country
"for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6233, 660 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees,
a non-binding regional human rights instrument incorporated into the domestic law of 15 Latin
American nations (Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) broadened this definition to
included persons feeling generalized violence. Article 111(3) of the Cartagena Declaration states, in
relevant part, "Hence the definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is
one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol,
includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom
have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive
violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."
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41 also recognizes the concept of non-refoulement: "The State shall respect
and guarantee the principle of non-return, in addition to humanitarian and
legal emergency assistance. 94 And finally, the Constitution prohibits penal
izing asylum-seekers for having entered or remained in Ecuador without
official status.95
As with the Constitution's anti-discrimination provisions, its guarantee of
the right to asylum is based on international human rights law. For example,
both the UDHR and the ACHR protect the right to asylum. 9 6 And the 1951
Refugee Convention
limits a signatory State's ability to penalize individuals
97
asylum.
seek
who
D. Ecuador'sRefugee Crisis
Prior to the early 2000s, Ecuador was an infrequent destination for
asylum-seekers. Between 1979 and 1999 the average number of refugees
arriving in Ecuador annually was just over 500. 9" Many who sought protection in Ecuador during this period were exiles from authoritarian regimes in
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 99 As a result,
Ecuador has traditionally enjoyed a reputation as a society that welcomed

Regional Refugee Instruments & Related, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the
International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico, and Panama (Nov. 22, 1984),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36ec.html [hereinafter "Cartagena Declaration"]. See also Eduardo Arboleda, Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of Pragmatism, 3 INT
J. OF REFUGEE LAW 185 (1991). See Liliana Lyra Jubilut, Fora and Programmes for Refugees in Latin
America, REGIONAL APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 245, 255-56 (Ademola

Abass & Francesca Ippolito eds., 2014). However, enforcement of the Cartagena Declaration was
inconsistent, focusing mostly on large-scale massacres. Tanya Korovkin, The Colombian War and
"Invisible Refugees" in Ecuador, 20 PEACE REV. 321, 325 (2008).
94. Constitution, Art. 41 (Ecuador).
95. Id. Article 41 states, in relevant part, "Persons requesting asylum or sanctuary shall not be
penalized or prosecuted for having entered the country or for remaining in a situation of irregularity."
96. Article 14(1) of the UDHR states, "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution." Article 22(7) of the ACHR states, "Every person has the right to
seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the state and
international conventions, in the event he is being pursued for political offenses or related common
crimes." The ACHR also recognizes State obligations regarding non-refoulement: "In no case may an
alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in
that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race,
nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions." ACHR Article 22(8).
97. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention states, "The Contracting States shall not impose
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a
territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in
their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence."
98. Refugee Population by Country of Asylum, 1960 2013 (End-Year Figures), UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a13eb6.html (listing the
total refugee population of Ecuador). Indeed, UNHCR did not have a field office in Ecuador until
2000. Korovkin, supra note 93, at 324-25.
99. See Diego Ramirez, Immigration Law Client Strategies in Central and South American
Leading Lawyers on Understanding Local Laws, Interacting with Government Agencies, and
Developing a Comprehensive Immigration Strategy, ASPATORE (2010).
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those fleeing persecution elsewhere. 0 0 Indeed, Ecuadoran officials have
often proudly touted the nation's openness toward refugees on the international stage. 1O

Migration into Ecuador began to increase significantly in the early 21 st
century, as growing numbers of Colombians began crossing the border into
Ecuador to flee the intensified violence in the decades-long armed conflict
between FARC guerillas, the government, and paramilitary forces. 10 2 The
exact number of Colombian refugees in Ecuador is unknown, but according
to UNHCR the total number of refugees arriving annually in Ecuador, the
vast majority of whom are Colombian, grew from 1,600 in 2000 to 123,000
in 2013.103
A significant number of Colombians refugees have applied for asylum in
Ecuador, putting a tremendous strain on the country's refugee determination
system. The number of asylum-seekers grew from 500 in 2000 to over

100. See Richard E. Bilsborrow, The Living Conditions of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Other
Colombians in Ecuador,UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, at 5 (2006), http://www.
unhcr.org/45adf2d82.pdf; See also Ian McGrath, Enhanced Refugee Registration and Human
Security in Northern Ecuador, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, at 3 (2011),
http://www.unhcr.org/4d35556e9.html ("Despite its security and development challenges, Ecuador is
often viewed as a model of refugee integration because of its open borders, generous rights
entitlements and lack of encampment policies.").
101. In August of 2014, Ecuador's Foreign Minister stated, "our country is a country of hosting
refugees, we have by historical tradition and people's mandate enshrined in our Constitution, to fulfill
that purpose. We have provided, in this sense, shelter and assistance to thousands of people from
around the world. Let's remember when our continent suffered the nightmare of repressive military
dictatorships in the Southern Cone, many citizens from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia and
Paraguay escaped to Ecuador where they obtained shelter and settled with their families. Also
hundreds of people from Colombia and other countries have done so. That is why Ecuador now is the
country with the highest number of refugees recognized in the Latin American region." See Statement
of the Government of the Republic of Ecuador on the asylum request of JulianAssange, MINISTERIO
DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y MOVILIDAD HUMAN, http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/statement-of-thegovernment-of-the-republic-of-ecuador-on-the-asylum-request-of-julian-assange/.
102. Between 1999 and 2006, approximately two million people facing recurrent massacres,
forced recruitment by the irregular armed forces, and aerial fumigation by the Colombian military as
part of a U.S.-financed effort to eradicate the cocaine trade were displaced within Colombia.
Additionally, an unknown number of civilians fled to neighboring countries, most notably Ecuador
and Venezuela. Korovkin, supra note 93, at 324. See also LAURA PARKER AND NICOLETTA RICCABIANCA, INVISIBILITY FOR THE REFUGEES: RISK AND OPPORTUNITIES OF ECUADOR'S THE NEW IMMIGRATION

POLICY (2015). The surge in refugees from Colombia was also fueled by the breakdown in peace talks
between the Colombian military, paramilitary groups and the FARC in 2002. Brad D. Jokisch,
Ecuador: From Mass Emigration to Return Migration? MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (2014),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ecuador-mass-emigration-return-migration. The 2016 peace
accord between those parties is unlikely to immediately stem the flow of refugees from Colombia, as
the violence that forces people from their homes is likely to continue along the border between the
two countries. See also Laura Gamba, El Nuevo Herald, Didlogos de paz no Frenan txodo de
Colombianos a Ecuador(July 4, 2016), http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/
colombia-es/article87580582.html (according to the UNHCR spokesperson in Ecuador, "about 500
Colombians continue to arrive in Ecuador per month, even with the prospect of peace on the
horizon").
103. Refugee Population by Country ofAsylum, 1960 2013 (End-Year Figures), UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (listing the total refugee population of Ecuador), http://www.unhcr.
org/pages/4a013eb06.html. In 2008, the last year for which data is available, Ecuador's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs estimated that there were approximately 500,000 Colombian refugees in Ecuador.
Ecuador's Refugee Policy, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GENERAL OFFICE FOR REFUGEES (2008).
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170,000 by 2013.104 Colombians filed 98% of those applications. 10 5 As of
refugees, by far the highest
September 2013, Ecuador had 55,000 registered
06
number of any Latin American country. 1
The Ecuadoran government's response to the Colombian refugee crisis has
changed over time as a result of developments in relations between the two
countries as well as domestic political pressures. In 2004, two-thirds of
Colombian asylum applications were rejected, compared to a one-fifth
rejection rate in 2000 when the number of applicants was far fewer. 107 These
figures reflect the increasing hostility toward Colombians prevalent among
the Ecuadoran population.108
However, in 2008 two things happened which fostered a more welcoming
attitude-at least within the Ecuadoran government-toward the everincreasing number of refugees crossing the border. The first was the approval
of the 2008 Constitution, which explicitly included the principle of universal
citizenship.10 9 The second was a military raid into Ecuador launched by the
Colombian government in March 2008 that resulted in the death of 19 FARC

104. Korovkin, supra note 93, at 324; The Mercosur Visa: A Band Aid for Ecuador's Rejected
Colombian Asylum Seekers, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL (2015).

105. Approximately 34% of the applications filed by Colombians were granted. See UNHCR, "A
Review of the Implementation of UNHCR's Urban Refugee Policy in Ecuador" (2013) [hereinafter
UNCHR 2013]; Refugees International, supra note 99.
106. UNHCR (2013), supra note 100, at 1. See also Ecuador,Amicus Brief Challenges Refugee
Decree, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 16, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/16/ecuador-amicusbrief-challenges-refugee-decree. With a population of approximately 16 million, Ecuador ranks ninth
among Latin American countries in that category.
107. Korovkin, supra note 93 at 325. At that time, Ecuador interpreted the Cartagena Declaration
narrowly, applying it only to those asylum seekers who were fleeing large-scale, well-document
massacres. Id. at 325. In addition, the government required that they produce a police record
documenting their persecution in Colombia, which many refugees did not possess. Id.
108. Although, as noted above, Ecuador has a history of welcoming immigrants from the United
States and Europe, as well as exiles from certain Latin American countries, it has been far less
accommodating toward immigrants from nearby countries, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru. See
Ramirez, supra note 94. Immigrants from Colombia in particular are seen as a security threat, a drain
on social welfare programs, and a threat to take jobs away from Ecuadorans. Diana M. Orces,
Democratic Values and Public Opinion Toward Immigrants: The Case ofEcuador, 51 LATIN AM. POL.
& SoCy 131, 137 38 (2009). In a 2011 poll, approximately 64% of Ecuadorans said that their
opinion of Colombians living in Ecuador was "bad" or "very bad." Beatriz Zepeda and Luis
Verdesoto, Ecuador, las Americas y el mundo 2010: Opinion publica y politica exterior (2011),
http://dominio1.cide.edu/documents/320058/00af85fd-678b-4040-a980-0038a3faf870.
Colombians
were by far the worst perceived of any immigrant group in the survey, which included Peruvians,
Cubans, Chinese, Americans, and Europeans. Id. Negative perceptions of Colombian refugees are
exacerbated by the media, which often portrays Colombians in a negative light.
109. Article 416(1) of the Ecuador Constitution states, "Ecuador's relations with the international
community shall respond to the interests of the Ecuadorian people, to which those persons in charge
of these relations and their executors shall be held accountable, and as a result, it advocates the
principle of universal citizenship, the free movement of all inhabitants of the planet, and the
progressive extinction of the status of alien or foreigner as an element to transform the unequal
relations between countries, especially those between North and South." Universal citizenship
"includes the notion that citizenship's subjects are entitled to certain fundamental rights incident to
the status, and that these rights are to be equally available to all; the ideal does not tolerate
'second-class citizenship."' Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 963, 968 (2000).
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guerillas and one Colombian soldier.11 0 This incident led to a break in
diplomatic relations between the two countries and otherwise poisoned
relations between President Correa and his Colombian counterpart, Alvaro
Uribe. 1 Afterwards, the Ecuadoran government began working closely with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and various NGOs to
register and process asylum applications for tens of thousands of Colombians
crossing the border into Ecuador.11 2 As a result of this effort, known as the
Enhanced Registration Program, the time for reviewing asylum applications
was reduced from several months to one day, and thousands of Colombians
received international protection. 113
The domestic and international political context of Ecuador's refugee
crisis shifted once again in 2010, when Juan Manuel Santos replaced Uribe as
Colombia's President. His election improved relations between the two
countries, including Correa supporting Santos' efforts to negotiate a peace
agreement with the FARC guerillas. 1 4 In order to legitimize that peace
process, Colombia needed to minimize its ongoing humanitarian crisis,
which had resulted in large numbers of internally displaced persons and the
mass exodus of Colombians to Ecuador. Ecuador could assist these efforts by
15
making it more difficult for Colombians to relocate within Ecuador.
Accordingly, in 2011 Ecuador added a second stage to its Refugee Status
Determination process in order to reduce what it perceived as fraudulent

110. See Luz Estella Nale, Colombia's Incursion into Ecuadorian Territory: Justified Hot Pursuit
or Pugnacious Error?, 17 JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 359-85 (2008). According to
research on relations between the two countries, periods of time in which Ecuador was most critical
of Colombia's militarized response to FARC rebels have corresponded with Ecuador's more peaceful
response to the paramilitary group, including welcoming Colombian migrants and displaced people.
See Marcela Ceballos Medina, La Politica Migratoria de Ecuador Hacia Colombia: Entre Ia
Integracion y Ia Contencion, 1 REGIONS AND COHESIONS 45, 68 (2011).
111. Manuel Gongora-Mera, Gioconda Herrera, and Conrad Mtiller, The Frontiers of Universal
Citizenship: Transnational Social Spaces and the Legal Status of Migrants in Ecuador, Working
Paper No. 71, at 28 (2014), http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS-document-0000000
20179?lang =de.
112. UNHCR, "Mobile Registration Project for Colombian Refugees in Ecuador" (2009), www.
unhcr.org/49d478206.html. The more aggressive processing of Colombian refugees at the Ecuadoran
border was, in part, a retaliation of the deterioration in bilateral relations between the two countries.
See Marcela Ceballos Medina, La Politica Migratoria de Ecuador Hacia Colombia: Entre Ia
Integracion y Ia Contencion, 1 REGIONS AND COHESIONS 45, 50-51 (2011). See also Colombian
Refugees in Ecuador: The collateral damage of a drug war and an insurgency, COUNCIL ON
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.coha.org/colombian-refugees-in-ecuador-thecollateral-damage-of-a-drug-war-and-an-insurgency/.
113. Ana Guglielmelli White, In the Shoes of Refugees: Providing Protection and Solutions for
Displaced Colombians in Ecuador, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (2011). The
Enhanced Registration Program was able to expedite the asylum application process because it
devoted significant resources to processing those applications in field sites at the border between
Colombia and Ecuador, rather than waiting for applicants to present themselves at application sites in
major cities, which many fear being detained due to their lack of immigration status. Id. The process
resulted in refugee visas which had to be renewed after one year, rather than full asylum status, which
entitles the asylee to apply for citizenship after one year.
114. Interview 1 (Aug. 2015); See also Rafael Correa Praises Colombia's FARC Deal, TELESUR
(April 16, 2016), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Rafael-Correa-and-Juan-Manuel-Santos-M
eet-to-Strengthen-Ties-20151215-0008.html.
115. Interview 1.
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applications. 116
More dramatically, in May 2012 President Correa issued Decree 1182,
which imposed drastic restrictions on access to asylum in Ecuador. Among
the most draconian of these restrictions was a reduction in the asylum
application deadline from three months to fifteen days of entry into the
country, and a reduction in the deadline for appealing an adverse decision
from fifteen days to three days. 1 17 Moreover, Decree 1182 declared that
Ecuador would no longer grant asylum to refugees fleeing generalized
violence, thus revoking Ecuador's accession to the Cartagena Declaration,
which had broadened the Refugee Convention's refugee definition.1 18 Asylum applicants would now have to prove that they were individually targeted
for persecution, rather than fleeing an armed conflict that victimized indiscriminately. Most refugees from Colombia would thus no longer receive
protection under this narrower refugee definition. Decree 1182 had its desired
effect: both the number of asylum applications and the asylum grant rate
dropped precipitously. In 2009, slightly over 34,300 asylum applications
were filed, and the grant rate was 71.8 percent. Between January and
September 2013 (the year after Decree 1182 was issued) only 8,300 applications were filed, and the grant rate fell to 6.2 per cent.11 9
V.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT LITIGATION OVER DECREE 1182

Cause Lawyering Strategy

The legal challenge to Decree 1182 demonstrates not only the opportunity
for improved rights outcomes provided by constitutionalized human rights

116. White, supra note 106, at 5. President Correa's explanation for this change in policy reflects
the alteration of the government's rhetoric toward Colombian refugees: "Before, the process was very
lax ... Sometimes, delinquents asked for refuge and were granted refugee status. This is ending."
Stephanie Leutert, Are Colombian Refugees Ecuador's Scapegoat?, WORLD POLICY BLOG, http://www.
worldpolicy.org/blog/201 1/12/14/are-colombian-refugees-ecuadors- scapegoats (last visited April 16,
2016). By this time, the rapid processing of asylum applications at the border had also ceased.
117. The Refugee Convention includes no limit on the time period within which an applicant must
file a claim for asylum after arrival in a destination country. Most refugee destination countries do not
impose an application deadline for asylum-seekers. The deadline in the United States, which has been
the subject of much controversy and protest, is one year. See Misha Seay, Better Late Than Never: A
Critique of the United States' Asylum Filing Deadline from International and Comparative Law
Perspectives, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 407, 433 (2011) ("Such a rigid filing deadline is out
of step with the practice of other countries that, like the U.S., admit large numbers of refugees into
their territories each year.").
118. See Cartagena Declaration, supra note 88.
119. Estadistica de Refugio, MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES

EXTERIORES

Y MOVILIDAD HUMANA,

http://cancilleria.gob.ec/estadistica-de-refugios/. Data on asylum applications and grant rate through
September 2013 are the most recent that the Ecuadoran government has made available. In January
2017, Ecuador's Organic Law on Human Mobility (Ley Organica de Movilidad Humana) went into
effect. The law is intended to provide specific procedures implementing the rights of non-citizens
under Ecuador's Constituton. Id. While it has been praised by refugee advocates for providing
citizenship to stateless people and temporary residence to recognized refugees, it has been criticized
for failing to include a clear procedure for appealing the denial of an asylum application and vague
standards for deporting non-citizens, such as those who "meddle[s] in internal political matters of
Ecuador." Id.
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law but also the increasingly sophisticated efforts of the lawyers who attempt
to seize those opportunities. 120 Informal lobbying by UNHCR and NGOs to
persuade the government to rescind or modify the Decree had proven
unsuccessful. 121 And because the policies imposed by Decree 1182 were
promulgated by a decree rather than a law, lobbying the National Assembly
was not a viable strategy. 122 At that point, Asylum Access Ecuador (the only
NGO in Ecuador that provides legal services to refugees) and the USF Quito
Clinic filed separate petitions to the Constitutional Court challenging the
Decree. 123 Asylum Access focused on what its lawyers called "administrative" claims: challenging the shortened deadlines and more limited definition
of "refugee". 124 The USF Quito Clinic challenged President Correa's author-

120. The standing requirement for legal challenges under Ecuador's Constitution is very broad.
The law on such standing states, in relevant part, that such challenges may be brought "by any person,
community, village, nationality or collective" who has been affected "in one or more of their
constitutional rights". See Ley Orgdnica de Garantfas Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional
[Law of Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control], Art. 9(1) Registro Oficial 52
(Ecuador), https://www.corteconstitucional.gob.ec/images/contenidos/normativa/Ley-organica de
garantiasjur.pdf. Moreover, the Constitution's section on jurisdiction states that "Any person, group
of persons, community, people or nation will be able to propose actions envisaged in the Constitution." Constitution, Art. 86(1) (Ecuador).
121. Interviews 8, 10-11. Lawyers with Asylum Access had attempted to negotiate with the
Ecuadoran government, particularly the Office of the Ombudsman (which is akin to the U.S. Attorney
General) over numerous refugee policies, including Decree 1182. According to one of its attorneys,
"That process didn't get us to any solution." Interview 10. In addition, one of the lawyers for the USF
Quito Clinic noted that the local UNHCR office had attempted to persuade the Foreign Ministry to
change Decree 1182, without success. Interview 11.
122. As one of the lawyers for the USF Quito Clinic noted, because the decree was issued by the
President rather than the legislature, "we thought [a court challenge] was the only way." Interview 11.
And under Ecuadoran law, any legislative enactment can be rejected by the President, which would
delay the enactment process for one year. See also Maria Dolores Mino, The Basic Structure of the
Ecuadorian Legal System and Legal Research, NYU LAW SCHOOL: GLOBALLEX (2015), http://www.
nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Ecuadorl.html#creationoflawsandratification. Thus, even if the Legislature had attempted to pass legislation annulling Decree 1182, President Correa could have struck it
down.
123. One of the lawyers at AAE described the decision to pursue a litigation strategy, as opposed
to continuing to work on a grassroots advocacy model, as follows: "Some things we want [the
refugees] to do themselves, that is actually being able to exercise their rights. [But] this challenge
under the Constitution is our part of the work; that's what we are being trained for." Interview 10.
124. Brief of Asylum Access Ecuador (Oct. 26, 2012). AAE argued that Decree 1182's shortened
deadlines for applying for asylum and appealing negative determinations violated the right to due
process under article 76 of the Constitution, as well as the right to travel under Article 66(14). Id. at
35-36. The government's response was that the shortened deadlines were necessary to prevent
asylum-seekers from filing fraudulent or flawed applications and "manipulating the process for their
personal gain, third parties or groups." See Government Brief (July 11, 2013). With respect to the
narrowing of the refugee definition, AAE argued that the Cartagena Declaration, which broadened the
refugee definition to include those fleeing armed conflict, is an international instrument and thus
enforceable under Article 11 of the Constitution. Id at 21. As such, any act that diminishes such a
constitutional right (in this case, Decree 1182) should be unconstitutional. Id. at 28 (citing 2008
Constitution, Article 11 (8)). AAE also argued that the Cartagena Declaration has become customary
international law within Latin America. Id. at 28. In response, the government asserted that Decree
1182's definition of "refugee" was consistent with international law and complimentary to the
Cartagena Declaration. "[The Cartagena Declaration] confers a universal concept, comprehensive,
general, and with no restrictive aspect, that neither opposes nor is exclusive to opposing, but rather is
complementary." See Government Brief, supra note 111.
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ity to attempt to change the law via executive decree. 125 The reason for this
split illustrates the level of intimidation felt by many NGOs in Ecuador:
Asylum Access took on the less controversial argument, not wanting to defy
President Correa's decree power. As an NGO operating with the permission
of the Ecuadoran government, Asylum Access could be shut down under the
vague parameters of Decree 16 if its activities were deemed to threaten
national security. 126 The USF Quito Clinic, which is not subject to Decree 16
because it is not a "social organization", was more willing to confront Correa
in this way.
The two claims were eventually joined by the Constitutional Court, and
they proceeded as one lawsuit. Soon thereafter, Human Rights Watch and the
Human Rights and Atrocity Prevention Clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law in New York filed an amicus curiae brief. 127 In challenging the
reduced time limits for asylum applications and appeals, the amicus brief
cited numerous provisions of international human rights law that are incorporated into the Ecuadoran Constitution, including the right to due process. 128
In addition, the amicus brief criticized Decree 1182 as a "retrogression" in
Ecuador's refugee rights law through its effective rejection of the Cartagena
Declaration's more expansive definition of a refugee. 129 In making this
argument, the amicus brief noted that the Constitution accepts as binding all
"international human rights instruments," including the Cartagena Declara-

125. Brief of USF Quito Clinic (Nov. 26, 2012). The Clinic argued that under Article 133 of the
Constitution, so-called "organic laws" (i.e., laws that, among other things, govern the exercise of
constitutional rights) cannot be issued absent approval by the National Assembly, which is Ecuador's
main legislative body. So-called "regular laws" do not require such legislative approval. Because
Decree 1182 affected the constitutional rights of refugees (including the right to seek asylum, which
is enshrined in the Constitution), and thus was an organic law, it should only have been enacted
through the National Assembly, rather than via executive decree. Id. at 10-12. In its response, the
government argued that Decree 1182 was necessary to fulfill the Ecuadoran government's obligation
under Article 423(5) of the Constitution to implement "policies that guarantee human rights of the
people living along borders and refugees." Government Brief (July 12, 2013).
126. On the one hand, Asylum Access was aware that it might be shut down by the government in
retaliation for its advocacy against Decree 1182. Interview 10. Indeed, it had been investigated by the
government for anti-government activities prior to the release of Decree 1182. Id. However, once
Decree 1182 was issued, Asylum Access' attitude changed and it became more defiant. According to
one of its lawyers, the organization felt that "if this [being shut down by the government] is going to
happen, let's do something to make that happen." Id. Nevertheless, this same lawyer thought it was
unwise to challenge Correa's ability to dictate policy via executive decree: "I really believe [that
argument] was a mistake ... I don't believe anyone in the country would tell the President that his
word is not the law." Id.
127. The lawyers for these two organizations met the Ecuadoran lawyers from AAE and the USF
Clinic through an assortment of academic and advocacy-oriented connections that illustrate the
importance of transnational advocacy networks as well as the globalization of cause lawyering over
the past two decades. See KECK AND SIKKINK, supra note 21); SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT (2004), supra

note 9. Interviews 7-10. And according to one of the lawyers at the Cardozo Clinic who had
experience with litigation on the right to education before the Colombian Constitutional Court,
"people were feeling hopeful ... seeing that [successful litigation before the Constitutional Court]
could happen in another context, maybe we could try it here." Interview 8.
128. The brief cited to the ICCPR and the ACHR, both of which guarantee due process protections.
129. Amicus Brief, Introduction.
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tion. 130 The amicus brief reminded the Court that Ecuador had previously
been recognized by the UNHCR131for its generous policies and practices
toward the treatment of refugees.
Lawyers involved in the Decree 1182 litigation, including those who
worked on the amicus brief, noted that the strategy of allowing the transnational legal organizations (i.e., Human Rights Watch and the Cardozo Clinic)
to focus on international human rights law was a conscious, collaborative
decision. 132 They felt that involving such lawyers to weigh in on Decree 1182
was a way to let the Constitutional Court know that, as one of the Ecuadoran
lawyers put it, "the world was watching." 133 According to that lawyer:
It helps the case when the Court feels like people outside are watching
them, and that this could be an issue that internationally could raise
some interest, and people in other countries might read the decision. In
a way (this is going to sound awful), but it's a way to put pressure on the
Court, as it's not only a couple of human rights advocates in Ecuador
who are concerned about this issue; it goes beyond Ecuador, and other
people are watching and other people are interested.
And that forces the
134
Court to give a better reasoning in its decision.
One of the transnational lawyers whose organization co-authored the
amicus brief sounded a similar theme, noting that such lawyers have both a
symbolic and political impact:
The fact that someone from abroad is paying attention to this case was
important... Even if we were saying the same things [the domestic
lawyers] were saying, the mere fact that someone from the outside was
paying attention was an important message for [the Constitutional
Court...] The Court and the government knew that it was not just
[domestic lawyers and NGOs] questioning the Constitutionality of the
law, but rather that there were international experts looking at this
decree and expecting a resolution from the Court. [... ] The added value
of the amicus[ ... ] was to leave no doubt as to what Ecuador's

international obligations were. 135

Another deliberate strategy employed by both the Ecuadoran and transnational lawyers was to invoke Ecuador's reputation for respecting refugee
rights as a shaming tactic. Thus for example, as part of the publicity
campaign pursued by the petitioners when the case was filed, the lawyers

130. Amicus Brief, Introduction.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Amicus Brief, § IV.
Interviews 7-11.
Interview 11.
Interview 11.
Interview 7.
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took advantage of the publicity surrounding the
Cartagena Declaration:

3 0 th

anniversary of the

There was a lot of positive press around Cartagena. We mobilized
around that, in thinking that if you say to Ecuador, "You've been so
generous in the past, you've been adhering to Cartagena, why are you
deviating now?" [We were]
thinking of it more as living up to its
36
previous commitments. 1
In a similar vein, the USF Quito Clinic brief admonished the government
for reneging on its obligations to refugees under the Cartagena Declaration:
This is a step backwards for refugee rights, and violates the principle of
non-regression, covered by international regulations governing the
matter. The Ecuadoran state cannot, under the principle "pacta sunt
servanda" [agreements must be kept] and good faith in the execution of
its international commitments, back out in its obligations and not adopt
in its internal regulation,
the provisions of the Cartagena Declaration on
137
the Right of Refugees.
This shaming strategy was consciously aimed at convincing the Constitutional Court to prevent backsliding on Ecuador's previously positive record
in the area of refugee rights. Nevertheless, the lawyers were careful to
modulate it in light of political realities. For example, one of the lawyers who
worked on the amicus brief noted that they had considered and rejected an
additional shaming strategy that would have focused on Ecuador being out of
step with the regional trend in Latin America of greater openness toward
immigrants generally and asylum-seekers in particular:
We did a whole analysis on regional trends and a[ ... ] shaming tactic
of, "Hey Ecuador, look at what you're doing, you are restricting when
everyone else is getting a little more open to the idea of asylum." That
section was cut because we decided[ ... ] to focus on the process and
... procedural due process concerns that are contravening [Ecuador's]
138
hard law obligations.
These litigation strategies employed in challenging Decree No. 1182
demonstrate that constitutionalized human rights treaty law can be used by

136. Interview 8. As noted above, Ecuador was the first Latin American country to incorporate the
Cartagena Declaration's broadened refugee definition into domestic law.
137. USF Quito Brief at para. 19.
138. Interview 8. The liberal trend on asylum law within Latin America has been analyzed by
several scholars. See, e.g., Pablo Ceriani Cernadas and Luisa Feline Freier, Migration Policies and
Policymaking in Latin America and the Caribbean: Lights and Shadows in a Region in Transition,
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, at 11-32 (David James Cantor, Luisa

Feline Freier, and Jean-Pierre Gauci, eds.) (2015).
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principled agents (here, cause lawyers) to seek rights objectives (here, the
right to apply for asylum within a reasonable period of time and under an
expanded definition of "refugee"), even where other indicia of treaty effectiveness (such as an independent judiciary and an unencumbered civil
society) are not present because of the underlying domestic and international
political context. The constitutional provisions utilized in this case included
the right of non-citizens to be free from discrimination and the incorporation
of human rights instruments, including the Cartagena Declaration, which
broadened the definition of refugee to include those fleeing generalized
violence. These provisions afforded cause lawyers an opening to challenge
Decree 1182 through litigation after non-legal attempts to alter state policy
had failed. Indeed, as one lawyer familiar with the Decree 1182 litigation
noted, the Constitution was "the only weapon [the lawyers litigating the case]
had." 139 It enabled them to challenge the government's failure to abide by its
human rights obligations incorporated into the Constitution. We now turn to
analysis of how this litigation strategy fared before the Ecuadoran Constitutional Court.
B.

Decision of the ConstitutionalCourt

In August 2014, the Constitutional Court issued a mixed decision on
Decree 1182. It ruled that the shortened time periods for filing asylum claims
and appeals violated the Constitution's principle of equality enshrined in
Article 11.140 In reaching this conclusion, the Court first noted that the time
limits were too short to allow access to the refugee process. 141 It then
reasoned that the time limits created "an unjustified difference" between
deadlines relevant to asylum applications and those applicable to other
administrative procedures under Ecuadoran law. 142 The Court also held that
the procedures governing such administrative processes "guarantee the
protection of persons faced with the possible affectation of their subjective
rights." 143 The Court thus equated refugees with citizens in terms of the need
for fairness in vindicating such rights. It ultimately reinstated the relevant
deadlines that existed prior to Decree 1182: 90 days to file an asylum

139. Interview 1.
140. Sentencia N. 002-14-Sin-CC, Case No. 0056-12-IN y 0003-12-IA, August 14, 2014, at 49
[hereinafter "Const. Court decision"].
141. The Court did not specifically reference any international human rights instruments, such as
the 1951 Refugee Convention, or even its own Constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to
asylum, in this part of its decision. However, the amicus brief filed by Human Rights Watch and the
Cardozo Clinic had pointed out that the ICCPR guarantees equal protection and prohibits discrimination, and that the ADHR guarantees due process through reasonable time limits for the determination
of rights. See Amicus Brief, supra note 131, at § III(A)(i).
142. Const. Court decision, at 49 ("[The time limits imposed by Decree 1182] violate the right of
equality, in that an unjustified difference exists between these time periods and those [established] for
the common administrative procedures, considering that both provide the protection of subjective
rights in the substantiation of processes."
143. Id.
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application and 15 days to appeal an adverse decision.44
In addition to rejecting Decree 1182's shortened deadlines, the Court
further ordered the reinstatement of the Cartagena Declaration into Ecuadoran asylum law. 145 This allows refugees to once again seek protection from
generalized violence such as Colombia's armed conflict. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted that Article 11 (3) of the Ecuadoran Constitution
incorporates international human rights instruments into Ecuadoran domestic
law, and that the Cartagena Declaration is such an international human rights
instrument. 146 Accordingly, the Court ruled, the Cartagena Declaration's
broadened definition of refugees should apply to those seeking asylum in
Ecuador. The Court's conclusion here was also based on the international law
principle of non-refoulement, which is explicitly recognized in Article 41 of
the Constitution. 147
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court let stand the manner in which
the substance of Decree 1182 was promulgated; i.e., through executive fiat
rather than the legislative process. 148 As noted above, the USF Quito Clinic
had argued that this process violated Article 133 of the Constitution, which
guarantees that any government action which arguably restricts a constitutional right must be arrived at through legislation rather than executive
decree. 149 The Constitutional Court rejected this argument, holding that
Article 147 of the Constitution, which provides for executive decrees, allows
the President to issue regulations necessary for the smooth running of public
administration. 150

The decision on Decree 1182 was therefore mixed from a human rights
advocacy perspective. It partially rejected the rollback of refugee rights by
the executive. This is a noteworthy result in and of itself, given the
Ecuadoran judiciary's history of weakness vis-a-vis the executive. It also
based its decision in this regard on international human rights law and
instruments that had been made part of the 2008 Constitution. Thus, the
Constitution, and the human rights law it incorporates, were a mechanism for

144. Several of the lawyers interviewed for this article expressed disappointment that the Court
did not abolish any deadline for applying for asylum, as they had pleaded in their submissions to the
Court. Interviews 8, 10, and 11. Nevertheless, one of those lawyers acknowledged, "the 90 day
deadline [for applying for asylum] has made life easier for everyone". Interview 10.
145. Const. Court decision, at 51-52 (Ecuador).
146. Id.
147. Id. Article 41 of the Constitution states, in part, "The State shall respect and guarantee the
principle of non-return, in addition to humanitarian and legal emergency assistance." The amicus
brief had pointed out that the principle of non-refoulement was set forth in Article 33 of the 1951
Refugee Convention. Amicus Brief, supra note 131, at § III(A)(ii).
148. Const. Court decision, at 43 (Ecuador).
149. This was the argument that Asylum Access Ecuador chose not to make because it would be
deemed as too confrontational to the Correa administration.
150. Article 147 (5) of the Constitution states that one of the duties of the President of the
Republic is "to direct public administration with a decentralized approach and to issue the decrees
needed for its integration, organization, regulation and monitoring."
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the mobilization of civil society to achieve positive rights outcomes.151 And
that mobilization was not a one-off phenomenon. It has had an enduring
effect: several of the lawyers who worked on the case say that the litigation
has strengthened the credibility of Asylum Access Ecuador in the eyes of the
government.15 2 This enhanced credibility will likely assist AAE as it participates in the debate over the implementation of Ecuador's recently enacted
human Mobility Law. 153
On the other hand, many of the lawyers who worked on the case felt the
decision was a severe setback because the Court upheld President Correa's
ability to limit constitutional rights through executive decree rather than the
legislative process. In their view, this part of the decision keeps the door open
for further decrees that violate the Constitution and the human rights law it
incorporates. As one of the lawyers for AAE put it: That part was very
painful, as it put a shadow on the [decision]. Now any rights can be ruled by
decree because of this [decision].15 4 And one of the lawyers for the USF
Quito Clinic decried this aspect of the ruling in declaring, overall, that the
155
decision was "one step forward and ten steps back."
Moreover, although the decision on Decree 1182 should have made the
asylum application process more accessible and should have increased
the likelihood of receiving asylum, it is unclear whether either has occurred.
The government has not released statistics on the number of asylum applications or the asylum grant rate in Ecuador since 2013, well before the
Constitutional Court's decision on Decree 1182. Moreover, in March 2014,
not long before the decision, Ecuador introduced the Mercosur Visa. It

provides temporary immigration status (renewable after two years), and with
it the right to work and receive benefits such as health care and housing.1 56 It
is generally issued within seven days of application, which makes it far more
attractive to many refugees than asylum, which is not guaranteed to the

151. See Elkins, et al., supra note 5.
152. According to one of the lawyers at AAE, "after receiving the [decision] from the Constitutional Court our relationship with the [government] improved. Suddenly we became a legitimate
actor regarding refugee law ... I lost the fear of presenting a constitutional challenge" Interview 10.
One of the transnational lawyers who helped draft the amicus brief confirmed this assessment: "All in
all it gave legitimacy to the work [AAE was] doing ... [so they could] go back to the local
[government agency that rules on asylum applications] and say, 'we just got this great win and this is
actually what you must do according to the law."' Interview 8.
153. See note 119, supra, for a description of the Human Mobility Law.
154. Interview 10.
155. Interview 11.
156. See Refugees International, supra note 104 (the Mercosur Visa is available to some migrant
entering Ecuador); see generally Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Why is
Migration Increasing in the Americas?, 11 MIGRATION POLICY DEBATES , Sep. 2016, at 2; Requisitos
Para Residencia Permanente Visa Mercosur (Requirements for Mercosur Visa Permanent Residence),
http://www.cancileria.gob.ec/requisitos-para-residencia-permanente-visa-mercosur/
(last visited
March 7, 2017) (requiring evidence only of citizenship and lack of criminal history).
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applicant and can take many months, if not longer, to receive. 157 Thus, even
though it does not offer international protection from refoulement, most
refugees in Ecuador have opted for it over applying for asylum. 158 As many
of the advocates interviewed for this article stated, the Mercosur Visa has
made refugees in Ecuador "invisible," converting them into migrants
with
159
limited, short-term legal status but without international protection.
Despite some harms, the decision on Decree 1182 thus benefited each of
the parties with interests in the outcome of the litigation. 160 President Correa
retained the President's ability to rule via executive decree on issues with
constitutional implications. Transnational and domestic cause lawyers, and
the non-citizens for whom they advocated, saw a return to the status quo on
asylum procedure and standards. One particular cause lawyering group,
Asylum Access Ecuador, successfully challenged the executive without
being shut down in retaliation; its reputation as a key player in the debate
over the rights of refugees may have been enhanced. And the traditionally
weak Ecuadoran Constitutional Court enhanced its credibility by declaring
an executive policy unconstitutional. So it was something of a win-win-win
result. Indeed, one lawyer for the USF Quito Clinic thinks (but cannot prove)
that the decision was16 the
result of an actual negotiation between the Court
1
and the government.
VI.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The Constitutional Court litigation over Decree 1182 suggests five key
points about the opportunities and limitations of constitutionalized human
rights law and how cause lawyers effectively use constitutionalized human
rights law on behalf of non-citizens.
First, constitutionalization provides what may be the most meaningful
legal mechanism through which principled agents (e.g., cause lawyers) can

157. On the other hand, the government may not renew a Mercosur Visa after the initial two-year
period if the refugee does not have a job or other evidence of financial support. And by that time, the
deadline for applying for asylum will have long expired.
158. Interviews 5, 10.
159. The refugee advocacy community in Ecuador has a conflicted attitude toward the Mercosur
Visa. Most appreciate the way it offers immediate status, and accompanying rights, to most refugees.
But these same advocates are concerned that it offers no international protection to refugees. Asylum
Access, which provides direct services to refugees in addition to pursing what it calls strategic
litigation on their behalf, bases its advice to individual refugees on the strength of their asylum claim.
If it is a particularly strong asylum claim, Asylum Access encourages them to apply for asylum. If not,
they advise them to apply for a Mercosur Visa.
160. In this way, the Constitutional Court's decision is reminiscent of the compromise between
branches of government that the U.S. Supreme Court struck in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803) (establishing the principle of judicial review of acts of Congress while limiting its jurisdiction
over presidential authority in this particular case).
161. "When I saw the decision I realized that there had been some conversations between the
government and the Court where the government had realized that there were some things they were
willing to let go, that ... maybe they had made a mistake. So the Court's decision in a way I think
was a compromise with the government in some aspects." Interview 11.
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advocate for the rights of non-citizens in "middle," or not fully democratic,
states. Given that such states generally offer few human rights protections to
non-citizens in their domestic law, constitutionalization of treaty law will
frequently offer the "only weapon" available to cause lawyers. It elevates
human rights law to the highest status within a state's domestic legal
framework, superior to conflicting statutes or other forms of domestic law.
Indeed, to the extent that a human rights instrument itself becomes incorporated into a national constitution (as in Ecuador), that instrument may hold
sway over any conflicting constitutional provisions. And because disputes
involving constitutional provisions are adjudicated by specialized constitutional courts with relatively modest dockets and liberal standing requirements, there are fewer of the procedural hurdles that may impede advocacy in
other court settings. At least in theory, then, constitutionalized human rights
law is perhaps the most powerful in the legal toolkit of cause lawyers
representing non-citizens in middle states.
In this case, constitutionalized human rights laws provided the only means
of effectively challenging Decree 1182. Other methods of advocacy, such as
negotiating directly with government officials, had proven unsuccessful.
Through Constitutional Court litigation, domestic and transnational cause
lawyers were able to achieve a limited, but nonetheless positive, rights
outcome by invoking specific constitutionalized human rights norms, such as
due process and nondiscrimination, and by referencing specific human rights
instruments, such as the ICCPR, the ACHR and the Cartagena Declaration,
which are incorporated into the Ecuadoran Constitution. 162 Without the
constitutional provisions that allowed for these human rights-based arguments, Decree 1182 would most likely still be in effect.
Second, while constitutionalized human rights law is a potentially powerful weapon, its on-the-ground significance is often limited by political and
legal realities, particularly in "middle" states. These realities include the
weakness of the judiciary's authority over the political branches of government, as well as the government's ability to silence civil society organizations that challenge state policy. In Ecuador, the latter of these factors
deterred Asylum Access Ecuador from challenging President Correa's ability
to limit the constitutional rights of asylum-seekers through executive decree.
One can also reasonably surmise that the relative weakness of the Ecuadorean judiciary's authority over the executive rendered the Constitutional Court
unwilling to declare Decree 1182 unconstitutional. Thus, while constitutionalized human rights law provided an avenue for the historically politicized
and non-independent Constitutional Court to partially return Ecuador's
refugee status determination process to the status quo ante, the underlying

162. Indeed, in this regard the Ecuadoran Constitution afforded greaterprotection to non-citizens
than international law, given that the 1951 Refugee Convention only protects refugees who face
persecution for specifically enumerated reasons.
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political and legal context prevented it from more fully confronting executive
power. 163
The underlying political and legal context may also limit the long-term
impact of the Constitutional Court's decision. In the context of Latin
American constitutional courts in particular, such impact typically can be
influenced by (1) whether the court's decision includes oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance and (2) the level of civil society engagement
with such mechanisms. 164 In its decision on Decree 1182, the Ecuadoran
Constitutional Court included no mechanisms to ensure the government
complied with its ruling. Such a mechanism might have been particularly
helpful with respect to the reinstatement of the broadened definition of
"refugee" in the Cartagena Declaration, which undergoes considerable subjective interpretation by government bureaucrats when they initially decide
asylum claims. Moreover, the intensity of civil society monitoring of the
Decree 1182 decision (even absent a formal mechanism for doing so) is
likely to be limited due to fear of government reprisal against civil society
organizations deemed to pose a threat to national security.
Third, transnational cause lawyers operating in "middle states" who hope
to overcome these often daunting political realities are likely to be more
successful if they become increasingly sophisticated tacticians, better able to
adapt to what Scheingold and Sarat term the "local scene" in developing
effective strategies that take into account the legal and political context on the
ground. 165 Earlier cause lawyering studies revealed a somewhat hamhanded, one-size-fits-all approach (usually rights- and litigation-based) by
transnational (mostly U.S.-based) cause lawyers who were tone-deaf to the
political, legal, and cultural context of the country into which they had

163. Such reluctance by courts to confront other branches of government in any serious way is not
unique to Ecuador. See, e.g., Neha Jain, The Democratizing Force of International Law: Human
Rights Adjudication by the Indian Supreme Court in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Anthea
Roberts et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2016) ("scholars have posited that the lack of any attempt
at principled decision-making is a deliberate strategy by the [Indian Supreme C]ourt to avoid serious
conflict with the other organs of the State ... Thus, its decisions 'seek to provide a workable modus
vivendi rather than to articulate high values' ... It has carefully avoided upsetting any major political
players and concentrated on political issues that are unlikely to directly threaten their interests.")
(citations omitted). The Ecuadoran Supreme Court's cautious approach confirms Richard Abel's
observation that cause lawyering is more about acting as a shield to protect rights (in this case, the
right to seek asylum) rather than a sword to create them. Abel supra note 34, at 69-117. See also
Jennifer Gordon, Concluding Essay: The Lawyer is not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns,
Law, and Social Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133 (2007) (observing that the efforts of cause lawyers
are more frequently devoted to shaping legal processes (which she describes as soft law) rather than
creating enforceable rights (hard law)).
164. See Rodriguez Garavito, supra note 34. See also Sandra Botero Cabrera, Courts thatMatter:
Judges, Litigants and the Politics of Rights Enforcement in Latin America (2015) (unpublished
graduate dissertation, Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame).
165. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT (2004), supra note 9, at 138 (citing case studies where cause lawyers
from the U.S. were ineffective or uninterested in mobilizing local opposition to state policies or U.S.
corporate practices in several developing countries).
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parachuted. 166 While the globalization of the legal profession provided
opportunities for transnational legal advocacy, the top-down nature of that
advocacy often eroded public support for the kinds of social changes that
those lawyers, and167the social movements with which they were affiliated,
sought to achieve.
The Ecuadoran case suggests that the era of culturally tone-deaf transnational cause lawyering may be ending. It demonstrates that cause lawyering
across borders is more likely to thrive, or at least reach modest success, when
it features a collaboration between domestic and transnational cause lawyers
that acknowledges the limitations and takes advantage of the strengths that
both sets of lawyers bring to the table. Thus, while Asylum Access decided to
participate in the litigation over Decree 1182, it chose not to aggressively
challenge the government's policy, lest that very government decertify it. The
USF Quito Clinic, less concerned about confronting executive power, challenged (albeit unsuccessfully) Correa's ability to restrict the rights of asylum
seekers through executive fiat. The transnational lawyers, aware of the
advantage accompanying their status as outside parties, also relied on
international human rights law arguments that would show the Constitutional
Court that "the world was watching" and would remind the Court of
Ecuador's reputation for protecting refugees. This coordinated strategy
reflects a sophisticated awareness of how to shape lawyering tactics to fit
political realities. It also demonstrated the power of collaborations between
principled agents on the domestic and transnational level. 168
The transnational collaborations in the litigation over Decree 1182 suggests a modification to the "boomerang" pattern of influence over state
behavior described by Keck and Sikkink. 16 9 In the typical boomerang
pattern, a domestic non-state actor (typically an NGO), frustrated by its
inability to influence its own government, reaches out to transnational NGOs,
who induce their own government (or third party organizations) to pressure
the recalcitrant state. 170 The litigation over Decree 1182 demonstrates that an
international network of cause lawyers is able to modify this pattern where
political and legal realities demand it. In this case, the impetus for the

166. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT (2004), supra note 9, at 138-39 (citing Noga Morag-Levine, The
Politics of Imported Rights: Transplantation and Transformation in an Israeli Environmental
Cause-Lawyering Organization, in CAUSE LAWYERING (2001), supra note 38, at 334-353; Shamir &
Chinsky, supra note 40; Lucie White, Two Worlds of GhanaianCause Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING
(2001), supra note 3, 8 at 35-67; Anne Bloom, Taking on Goliath: Why Personal Injury Litigation
May Represent the Future of Transnational Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING (2001), supra
note 38, at 96-116.
167. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT (2004), supra note 9, at 137.
168. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 21.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 12-13. In a corollary to the boomerang effect known as "re-entry", domestic actors
submit disputes with their government to international bodies that issue rulings that create legal
change at the domestic level. See Torelly, supra note 24, at 11 (citing MARCELO NEVES, TRANSCONSTITUTIONALISM (2013) at 32-33, 41-42, 75).
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involvement of the transnational lawyers did not come from the domestic
cause lawyers; the transnational lawyers were already aware of the decree
and proceeded to engage in conversations with domestic cause lawyers about
how best to challenge it. Moreover, the transnational lawyers did not demand
that other states or intergovernmental organizations pressure the Ecuadoran
government to abolish the decree. Rather, they applied that pressure themselves, in the form of an amicus brief to the Constitutional Court that
highlighted Ecuador's obligations under international human rights law.
Thus, rather than a boomerang thrust into the air by a single individual that
gains strength as it circles back towards it target, the transnational advocacy
network featured in the Decree 1182 litigation more closely resembled a
two-person catapult, where the combined efforts of two individuals are
necessary to launch a projectile over a wall that would otherwise be
impenetrable to either combatant acting alone.
Domestic and transnational cause lawyers who follow this two-person
catapult model are able to exploit what Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have
termed the "global industry" of the rule of law. 17 1 Such lawyers directly
pressure states through their judiciaries, rather than waiting--perhaps endlessly-for other states, intergovernmental or international organizations, to
intervene. The growing constitutionalization of human rights law over the
past few decades facilitates--one might even say invites-this direct pressure: human rights law is the linguafranca of transnational cause lawyers,
and when states accord it premium status in their domestic law by incorporating it into their national constitution, they provide direct access for such
lawyers to challenge state behavior. 172 In this way, constitutionalized human
rights law realizes political claimants' language of fundamental rights, and in
the process develops an ever-expanding body of domestic law. 17 3 It also
creates opportunities for cause lawyers and other activists to generate broader
domestic political involvement, e.g. through lobbying of government

officials. 174
Fourth, contrary to some of the earlier writing on cause lawyers, effective
cause lawyering at the transnational level need not be exclusively "communityoriented and community place-oriented." 175 Cause lawyering studies suggest
that in order to be successful in addressing local disputes, transnational cause

171. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAYWERS,
ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002) Dezalay and Garth note

the growing "global industry promoting the import and export of the 'rule of law."'. Id. at 3.
Similarly, they assert that "in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, a burgeoning group of
consultants, think tanks, philanthropic foundations, and national and transnational agencies has come
to the conclusion that, whatever the problem, an essential part of the solution is an independent and
relatively powerful judicial branch." Id.
172. See Elkins, et al., supra note 5.
173. See Torelly, supra note 24 at 11-12.
174. Id. at 12.
175. Samir & Shiv, supra note 38, at 287-304; Coutin, supra note 38, at 117-40; see also
Scheingold & Sarat, supranote 9, at 139.
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lawyers need to take their cues from the local community, rather than pursue
a litigation strategy that ignores underlying problems affecting that community. 176 Indeed, a pure rights-based approach to social change lawyering has
been criticized in many quarters for a variety of reasons, including diverting
public attention and scarce resources from grassroots, community-based
advocacy methods, privileging the role of lawyers in social movements, and
focusing on short-term court victories rather than longer-term social movement goals. 177 Due at least in part to these critiques, cause lawyers have, over
the past two decades, been encouraged to integrate their legalistic strategies
with community empowerment
and grassroots activism in order to achieve
178
meaningful social change.
However, as the Decree 1182 litigation illustrates, litigation without
corresponding grassroots/community-based advocacy can be an effective
strategy in the context of representing non-citizens in "middle states" where
the cause at issue is access to international protection through asylum. In
such a context, the options for community-based, grassroots advocacy are
limited. Asylum-seekers, particularly in the developing world, are recent
arrivals in their country of refuge, with little opportunity to engage with any
active social movements. Their main goal is obtaining access to state
protection rather than a particular benefit of citizenship that might be the
source of popular mobilization. They are, in Hannah Arendt's words, seeking
the "right to have rights." 179 A litigation-oriented approach will thus typically
provide the most efficient means of achieving this goal, especially when the
national Constitution contains human rights provisions applicable to the
rights of non-citizens. In this way, lawyers who reference constitutionalized
international human rights law in domestic court on behalf of non-citizens
are providing greater protection to that group of claimants than was previously available to them. This suggests that the cause lawyering literature, at
least when it is focused on "middle" countries, needs to take into account
how cause lawyers have utilized the rapidly expanding number and scope of
constitutionalized human rights treaty norms.
Finally, this article has identified several factors that may influence the
degree to which principled agents are able to use constitutionalized human
rights law to accomplish their rights objectives on behalf of non-citizens in
"middle states." These factors include:

176. See Torelly, supra note 24 at 11-12.
177. See, e.g., STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND

POLITICAL CHANGE (2d ed. 2004).
178. See Stephen Bachman, Lawyers, Law and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1 (1984); William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO L. REV. 445 (1994-1995); GERALD P. LOPEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).

179. Hannah Arendt, The Rights of Man: What are They?, 1 MODERN REV. 30, 34 (1949).
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* The presence of domestic cause lawyers who challenge state practices on the grounds that they violate constitutionalized human rights
180

norms;

* The presence of transnational cause lawyers who challenge state
practices by referencing international human rights law that has been
incorporated into the domestic constitution, either through reference
to international instruments or to provisions derived from such
instruments;
* The country's global reputation for protecting human rights, which
allows principled agents to engage in shaming tactics;
* The extent to which the rights-based challenge advanced by the cause
lawyers threatens key state actors; and
* Whether the government has other means at its disposal to achieve its
policy objectives and thus limit the rights of the affected group.
Each of these factors played a role in the litigation over Decree 1182.
Some of these factors facilitated the Constitutional Court's decision to return
Ecuador's asylum determination process and legal standards to the status quo
ante: the presence of sophisticated domestic and transnational cause lawyers,
a national reputation for openness toward refugees, and the easy availability
of the Mercosur Visa, which rendered waiting for an asylum status determination less desirable for most refugees, even under re-instated application
deadlines and legal standards. Others factors influenced the court to refrain
from issuing a more robust decision that would have significantly broadened
the human rights protections for non-citizens-the aspect of the lawsuit that
most challenged executive power was the claim that Correa could not limit
the rights of asylum-seekers through executive decree.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The litigation over Decree 1182 demonstrates that the constitutionalization
of human rights law is not an automatic ticket to improved human rights
behavior by individual states. 81 Politics often gets in the way. Principled

180. One example of such a constitutionalized human rights norm in the Ecuadoran case is the
broader definition of refugee, based on the Cartagena Declaration. That definition has been
incorporated into the Constitution through Article 41, which recognizes the right to asylum "in
accordance with the law and international human rights instruments." See CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR 2008, art. 41. Given that the Cartagena Declaration is a non-binding legal
instrument, its incorporation into the Constitution is an example of how soft law obligations can
constitute an important part of human rights commitments. See Wuerth, supra note 27, at 67 ("One
way of maximizing benefits and minimizing costs would be to acknowledge that international human
rights are in some sense soft international legal obligations although they are often included in
binding domestic law.").
181. For example, while the constitutions of thirteen E.U. member states (Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia,
and Spain) contain the right to asylum, "constitutionalized asylum" has been underutilized for a
number of reasons, most notably the availability of refugee protection through the 1951 Refugee
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agents (in Simmons' parlance) must adapt to those political realities in
forging strategies that include legal challenges based on constitutionalized
human rights law. The success of their efforts depends, in part, on the factors
identified in the previous section of this article.
In addition, this article has demonstrated that the diffusion of human rights
law through incorporation into national constitutions creates significant
opportunities for cause lawyering in developing countries. That diffusion has
substantially expanded the tool kit with which cause lawyers operating both
domestically and transnationally can raise domestic court challenges to state
policies that adversely affect their clients. Constitutionalization can transform lofty statements of aspiration embedded in human rights treaties into
concrete and enforceable causes of action. It can convert otherwise unfamiliar and vaguely threatening international law into domestic law which
domestic court judges are more comfortable interpreting and applying. But it
is far from a panacea. Rather, the effective use of constitutionalized international human rights law, particularly in emerging democracies, will often
depend on a lawyer's sophisticated awareness of a host of factors relevant to
the local political and legal landscape. It will also often depend on collaboration between domestic and transnational cause lawyers, where each focuses
on the legal strategies and arguments most the judges will find most
compelling coming from each particular actor.
Indeed, the litigation over Decree 1182 in Ecuador suggests that the
constitutionalization of international human rights law has rendered effective
cause lawyering in developing countries neither exclusively top-down nor
bottom-up. 182 It is not only a matter of "alternative lawyering" that takes its
cues from grass roots mobilization. Nor is it exclusively dictated by elite
lawyers, NGOs, and law schools from the "Global North." Rather, it is the
result of an institutionally self-aware combination of strategies and resources
sufficiently agile to respond to (and influence) political realities on the
ground. And to the extent that one of those realities is a judiciary that aspires
to some level of power and independence, constitutionalized treaty law can
be part of that equation.

Convention. See Helene Lambert, Francesco Messineo & Paul Tiedemann, Comparative Perspectives
of Constitutional Asylum in France, Italy, and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?, 27 REFUGEE SURV. Q.,
No. 3, at 16, 18-32 (2008). However, asylum is broader than refugee status, and as the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) has noted, "Member States may grant a right of asylum under their
national law to a person who is excluded from refugee status." See Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B &
D, Joined Cases C 57/09 & C 101/09, [2010] E.C.R 1-10979 (In that case, the German Federal
Administrative Court had asked the CJEU to clarify whether someone denied refugee status because
of criminal activity under Article IF of the Refugee Convention might nevertheless be eligible for
asylum under the German Constitution). Id. at 26 (citing Case No. 1407765, Metautres v. Republique
Fran(aise, Decision 16 Sep. 2014, 3-4).
182. As Alison Brysk has observed, human rights mobilization and enforcement proceeds along a
dynamic horizontal rather than vertical plane, involving myriad interconnected individuals and
organizations that defy the static categories of "top down" or "bottom up." See Alison Brysk, Human
Rights Movement, POLITY (forthcoming).
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In drawing conclusions from this experience, it is useful to return to the
question posed in the literature on crucial case studies: does this article's
analysis of the Decree 1182 litigation confirm or deny the theory that the
constitutionalization of human rights law leads to better human rights
outcomes? The answer has two parts. The first is that, at least in the short
term, it confirms the theory that but for the inclusion in the Ecuadoran
Constitution of provisions guaranteeing equality and non-discrimination on
the basis of migratory status, as well as the incorporation of human rights
instruments such as the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, Decree 1182 and its
limitations on the rights of asylum seekers would very likely still be in effect.
As the plaintiff's attorneys noted, the Constitution was the only effective
means of challenging that decree. Accordingly, that constitutional challenge
undeniably improved human rights outcomes for non-citizens seeking asylum in Ecuador. While that improvement may not have been as robust or as
durable as some advocates had hoped, it was an improvement nonetheless.
The second part of the answer concerns the long-term impact of the
decision, and it is more complicated. Whether the decision ultimately creates
lasting, positive human rights outcomes for non-citizens in Ecuador depends
on a variety of circumstances that will unfold over the next several years.
These include: how decision-makers at various levels of the Ecuadoran
refugee status determination process will interpret the broader definition of
"refugee" under the Cartagena Declaration, whether President Correa's
successor will issue additional decrees limiting the rights of asylum-seekers
and whether cause lawyers and other principled agents are successful in
challenging such limits, whether the nascent peace process underway in
Colombia will stem the flow of large numbers of refugees into Ecuador,
whether the Mercosur Visa will remain a more favorable option than asylum
for the majority of refugees crossing into Ecuador, and whether the new
Human Mobility Law will establish sufficiently specific
procedures and
183
standards relevant to the refugee determination process.
What is undeniable, however, is the importance of constitutionalized
human rights treaty law in offering protection to the most vulnerable of
groups-non-citizens-at a time when civil strife, terrorism, and climate
change have increased their numbers to unprecedented levels. This protection is particularly important in developing states, where domestic law may
otherwise be unhelpful to non-citizens. Whether such constitutionalized
treaty law will actually assist non-citizens in a given political and legal
context depends on the factors identified in this article.

183. See supra note 119 for a discussion of the recently enacted Human Mobility Law.

